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Displaying items by tag: MCIB

Lack of sufficient planning and lack of adequate emergency communication were factors in an incident where two of three men on a sea angling trip lost their lives off the Donegal coast over two years ago.

“Restrictive” procedures with the Emergency Call Answering Service (ECAS) also meant the men on board the vessel were in the water for five hours before the alarm was raised, the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report has found.

Two drafts of the MCIB report were circulated as part of a comprehensive investigation into the deaths of Gerry 'Malin' Doherty, who was in his sixties, and Thomas Weir (16) off Portronan, north Donegal, on July 17th, 2018.

A third man who is in his late 40s, survived after he clung onto a buoy for five hours before being spotted and brought to safety. He was the only one of the three wearing a personal flotation device.

The three had set out on a 5.9m (19 ft) glass-reinforced plastic craft from Port Ronan pier around 9 am that morning, and fished for over an hour. They were unable to restart the engine, and a wave washed over the hull and capsized it.

The report finds that seven factors contributed to the severity of the incident including the fact that the boat was anchored from the stern, making it more susceptible to being swamped in “any type of sea”.

The MCIB report notes that a crew member tried to make an emergency call on a British mobile phone, but as the call was being put through the phone fell into the water. There was no VHF radio onboard.

The emergency call was received by the ECAS centre but the report says that “restrictive procedures” were “not sufficiently flexible for a situation which required the ECAS operators to be more proactive in transferring all the information available to the Coast Guard”.

“Because the information in the recording of the emergency call was not transferred shortly after 10:16 hrs. the casualties were in the water for five hours,”the report says, and “this increased the severity of the incident”.

Marine communications are very different from land-based communications and the ECAS system is a land-based emergency call answering system with limitations for use at sea.

The MCIB report says that a mobile phone should not be relied on as the primary method of contacting emergency services and says that VHF radio as the primary means of contacting emergency services should be used by all boat owners in all instances, including in competitive sailing events.

The MCIB says that since the incident, the Irish Coast Guard has protocols in place for handling emergency calls and ECAS has also “updated policies.

However, it says that the Minister for Climate Action, Communication Networks and Transport should consider whether the Irish Coast Guard and ECAS “should have these policies, their implementation internally, and their coordination with each other, suitably reviewed and or audited”.

The MCIB report is here

Published in Angling
Tagged under

An investigation into the death of the young west Cork fisherman Kodie Healy in Dunmanus Bay last year says he may have fallen overboard his boat.

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report published today says Mr Healy had only bought the boat three to four weeks before the incident on October 9th, 2019.

The 23-year-old man was a trained and experienced commercial fisherman and was on a day off when he went fishing for mackerel and pollack in the 5.7-metre open deck GRP vessel Tommy R 

He was not wearing a lifejacket or personal flotation device (PFD), and the report notes that he may not have known that there was a satellite personal locator beacon (PLB) onboard the vessel.

The hull was not found, but wreckage was picked up widely, and his body was located by divers north-west of Carbery island in a gulley or crevice in 11 metres of water on October 13th.

There had been an extensive search for Mr Healy, after he was reported overdue by his father, John Healy - from a well known west Cork fishing family - on the evening of October 9th last year.

An autopsy identified death by acute cardio-respiratory failure due to drowning.

The MCIB report concludes that “the most probable cause” of his death was that he fell overboard sometime after 1 pm when close to the northwest shore of Carbery Island.

“The ‘Tommy R’ steering would have been uncontrolled and the boat would have come into close proximity of the Carbery breaker or the seas northwest of Carbery island,” the report says.

The boat would then have been “overwhelmed, broken up and sunk by a breaking sea”.

Contributory factors identified by the MCIB include adverse weather, with a small craft warning and rough seas in Dunmanus Bay.; and the fact that Mr Healy was not wearing a PFD.

The report says he was fishing “on his own in very dangerous seas off Carbery breaker and Carbery island”, and the vessel was not suitable for those sea conditions on that day.

The qualified commercial fisherman who trained at the National Fisheries College, Castletownbere had left to fish in Dunmanus Bay at 8 am on that morning,

The Irish Coast Guard, RNLI, Naval Service, West Cork Underwater Search and Rescue dive team and Blackwater SAR Daunt and Cork Sub Aqua were among units involved in the extensive search.

Shortly before 10 pm that first night, boat wreckage was found at Drishane point on the Dunmanus peninsula.

The report says that the Tommy R was previously a fishing vessel named the FV Jamie Andrea, and was removed from the fishing vessel register by application in August 2017. As a recreational craft, it was exempt with compliance with the EU directive on fishing vessels of this size.

It says that “from the type and condition of the wreckage, it may be deduced that the boat’s sinking was rapid leaving little time for the casualty, if he was on board and not incapacitated, to send out a distress signal, call for help, grab a lifesaving device or prepare to abandon the boat”.

The report says Mr Healy used the boat for recreational fishing on several occasions prior to the incident.

The boat, built-in 1983, had declarations of compliance, with stability declared as satisfactory.

There was no record of a VHF licence, but the radio was reported to be working. However, there was no reported VHF communication from the vessel.

The report says Mr Healy intended to use a dive board method - a device with several fish lures attached which is trolled at the end of a line behind a boat moving slowly forward at around two to three knots.

In correspondence, Mr Healy’s father John included a number of omissions in the draft report.

Mr Healy said his son was a very experienced seaman, having fished from the age of seven and in waters from “Rockall to the English Channel” in later years.

“Personally, I believe that without more sightings of the boat on that day or, ideally, having the GPS tracker for that day, it is fair and reasonable to say at this time that only the sea holds the mystery of what happened,” Mr Healy wrote.

Published in MCIB

Two airline pilots on board a yacht which collided with a tanker off Greystones in the Irish Sea last year have disputed criticism of their experience in a report by the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB).

The MCIB inquiry into the collision between the 11.7m (38 ft) yacht Medi Mode and the 88m chemical tanker Varkan Ege on the night of August 23rd, 2019 highlights issues with some of the actions taken by both vessels.

The yacht was extensively damaged but was able to make its way to port, and there were no injuries and no pollution caused in the incident.

Damage to hull, starboard side Photo: courtesy MCIBDamage to hull, starboard side Photo: courtesy MCIB

However, the MCIB - which does not apportion blame or fault in its reports - calls on the Minister for Transport to alert recreational sailors and motorboat users to the need for “appropriate training” and compliance with international regulations on prevention of collisions at sea.

The event occurred in three miles east of Greystones at night, but with good visibility and good weather.

The Moody class yacht was en route to its home port of Howth, Co Dublin, and the chemical tanker registered in Turkey was on passage from Dublin to Falmouth, England.

Tanker ‘Varkan Ege'Tanker ‘Varkan Ege' Photo: courtesy MCIB

A “close quarters situation” and subsequent collision occurred at 02.22 hours.

The tanker stayed with the yacht to ensure it did not need assistance. It made its way to Greystones harbour.

The MCIB report says that the tanker reported seeing a red or port side light some 1.5 nautical miles away, and six minutes before the collision.

A demonstration of the incident contained in the MCIB reportA demonstration of the incident contained in the MCIB report

It says the ship altered course to starboard four minutes before the collision. It also reduced speed and used “sound signal” to request the yacht to indicate its intentions.

The yacht had believed no risk of collision existed as the navigational warning lights on both vessels were “green to green” or starboard to starboard.

The yacht was unaware its own light was showing “red”, due to yawing of its mast from a following wind.

The yacht kept its course and speed in the belief that the tanker would pass clear on its starboard side, the report states.

While the report says the tanker “complied with efforts to avoid a collision when it became apparent that collision was possible”, it is critical of the fact that the tanker tried – unsuccessfully - to communicate via VHF radio with the sailing vessel when it was so close.

“This wasted valuable time when an immediate alteration of course to starboard may have been sufficient to avoid collision,” the report states.

It says that the two crew members of the yacht Medi Mode- who are not named in the report - had “many years’ experience of sailing” but they “had no formal marine navigation training”.

“They had no recognised course on the Collision Regulations (COLREGS),”the report says, noting “this was a contributory factor particularly in relation to International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972“.

In a response to the report, a representative of the yacht acknowledges that both crew did not have formal qualification in marine navigation.

It states that as “professionally qualified airline pilots of considerable experience, we are both well-grounded in the aviation COLREGS” or collision regulations”.

The letter says that these aviation collision regulations are “very similar to those pertaining to the marine, with an added third dimension”.

Under collision regulations, a power-driven vessel “shall keep out of the way of a sailing vessel”, but the report says that the yacht was not a sailing vessel in this situation as “both engine and sails were being used for propulsion”.

The report notes that the tanker claims it observed the yacht altering its course to port just before the collision, but the yacht says it kept its course. It says this cannot be determined definitively, as the yacht did not have the technology to record this.

However, the two vessels were on a collision course before it happened, the MCIB says, with the prow of the yacht striking the port bow of the tanker.

The report says the tanker’s speed was 7.5 knots and the yacht had a speed of 7.9 knots.

The report says that “both vessels should have observed each other and avoided a close-quarters situation developing”, where vessels are dangerously close.

It says the yacht should have seen the tanker’s lights at a range of six miles, and the tanker should have observed the yacht lights at a range of one mile.

It says the report by the master of the Varkan Ege tanker does not indicate there was a lookout on the bridge at the time of the collision but does state that the “lookout kept an eye of the sailing vessel”.

It also notes a “conflict” in the information provided by the master and the watchkeeper on the tanker.

It notes that neither vessel took compass bearings of each other to determine if there was a risk of collision.

The report says that “tiredness and fatigue cannot be completely ruled out as a contributing factor in the collision”.

The report recommends a marine notice highlighting the requirements in chapter two of the code of practise on the safe operation of recreational craft be issued by the Minister for Transport.

It says that “in particular, attention should be drawn to” the section on the need to undertake “appropriate” training in sailing and motorboat activities, and on compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972).

Published in MCIB

Two civil servants have stepped down from the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB), following a European Court of Justice ruling which found it lacked independence.

As The Sunday Times reports today, Ireland is not appealing the recent EU court judgment, according to the Department of Transport.

It is understood the Irish state is still liable for legal costs over its decision to challenge the European Commission’s issue with the board’s make-up.

The EU had taken issue with two of five board members being Ireland’s chief marine surveyor and the Department of Transport secretary-general’s nominee.

The EU said that the responsibilities and activities of both the transport department and Marine Survey Office (MSO) could conflict with the investigative task.

Confirming the resignations of both civil servants, the MCIB said it had been “advised that vacancies will be filled in accordance with standing Government policy after the introduction of legislation to give effect to the recent decision of the European Court of Justice”.

The Department of Transport said it has “sought legal advice on legislative and administrative options to address the court findings and the concerns of the EU Commission, and is currently examining same”.

The EU court judgment was published earlier this summer, two years after it initiated its case against Ireland over the MCIB’s lack of independence.

It found that Ireland was “not fulfilling its obligations under Article 8(1) of Directive 2009/18” governing the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector” .

In its defence, Ireland had argued that the MCIB reports are independent.

The MCIB is responsible under the Merchant Shipping Act and the Merchant Shipping Regulations for conducting investigations into marine casualties in Irish waters and Irish-registered vessels.

It is a non-prosecutorial body which does not enforce legislation, and its investigations do not apportion blame or fault, but recommendations have regularly been made to the Irish minister for transport.

However, almost 300 of its reports on commercial fishing and recreational casualties, and incidents involving ferries, ships and other vessels have been made public since its establishment 20 years ago.

Read The Sunday Times report here

Published in MCIB

The latest Marine Notice from Department of Transport highlights the importance of planning seagoing voyages, especially those involved in fishing.

It follows a recommendation from the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) this summer in its report on the sinking of a West Cork fishing vessel in Ardglass, Co Down last year.

As previously reported on Afloat.ie, the Dillon Owen was entering Ardglass harbour to land its catch and refuel on 23 October last when it grounded, lost power and then drifted onto rocks.

All five crew on board were uninjured and airlifted to safety, but the vessel could not be towed off the rocks at Phennick Point and sank over the following days.

The MCIB report noted that the crew lost valuable time to drop their primary anchor — which would likely have avoided the drift into the rocks in the shallow harbour — by instead focusing on attempts to release the trawl doors.

Also suggested in the report was a call on the Minister for Transport to issue a Marine Notice for fishing vessel owners and operators to develop contingency plans and drills for such incidents.

Full details are available in Marine Notice No 41 of 2020, a PDF of which is available to download below.

Published in MCIB

An angler who drowned in Lough Mask in Co Mayo over a year ago was not wearing a lifejacket, the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) has found.

A report by the MCIB published yesterday (Tues, September 1) has been unable to establish the cause of the incident in which a 78-year old experienced angler drowned in March 2019.

However, it says that the fact that the man’s boat was found in an upright position would suggest that he fell overboard and was unable to get back into the vessel.

The man, who lived locally near Lough Mask, left Cushlough slip near Ballinrobe at approximately 12.30 on March 8th, 2019.

Weather conditions deteriorated during the day from westerly force four to force six, with wind gusts of force seven.

The alarm was raised at 7.23 pm after the man failed to return at 6 pm and his mobile phone was off.

A local person travelled to his house to see if he had returned home and then contacted the gardai at Ballinrobe.

An air and coast search by the Irish Coast Guard Rescue 118 helicopter and Corrib Mask Search and Rescue found nothing, but the vessel was located the following day on the eastern shore of Lough Mask, about 1.5 nautical miles north of Cushlough slip.

The vessel was reported to be in “good order”, according to the MCIB report, with the outboard engine in the lifted position and the port side oar in the shipped position.

The report says the vessel’s starboard side oar was subsequently found in the water nearby, along with the angler’s cap.

A personal flotation device (PFD), fishing gear, supplies and rod were in the stowed position in the vessel.

A PFD stowed in forward part of the lake boat under the gunwale Photo: MCIBA PFD stowed in the forward part of the lake boat under the gunwale Photo: MCIB

The search was hampered by prolonged bad weather periods. The man’s body was located on March 30th near where the vessel had been found. He was not wearing a PFD.

“The casualty was considered locally to be an experienced angler,” the report says, and “had been angling on Lough Mask for many years, and had entered numerous fishing competitions”.

However, it says that “even an experienced angler would have found the conditions challenging”.

An inquest on November 28th, 2019, recorded the cause of death as asphyxia due to drowning.

The MCIB report notes that Lough Mask has “no navigation marks to warn water users of danger”, and “with water levels at the time of the year when the incident occurred, awareness of hazards below the water would be all the more difficult”.

Water temperature at the time of the incident was 8°C, and the report notes that cold water shock is a factor in water temperatures below 15°C.

“This, combined with the casualty not wearing a PFD, would have considerably reduced his chances of survival”, it states.

The MCIB recommends that the Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport issue a marine notice, reminding mariners of their obligations to comply with the “Code of Practice for the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft”.

It says special emphasis should be placed on the need to be aware of the current forecast for the area; the requirement to wear a PFD, and the need for a boarding ladder, or “other effective means of quickly re-boarding a vessel”.

It says “clubs should be requested to bring this notice to the attention of their members”.

Published in MCIB

Canoeists, kayakers and relevant organisations are encouraged to review the Code of Practice for the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft, following a recent report into the death of a kayaker on Lough Gill.

As previously reported on Afloat.ie, the lone kayaker was believed to have become separated from his Canadian canoe in bad weather on the Co Sligo lough in late January 2019.

The vessel had not grablines to aid recovery after the casualty had entered the water, the MCIB report said, adding that he may have been weighed down by his Wellington boots, and had only a mobile phone and no other means of signalling for help.

The report recommended a Marine Notice highlighting the requirements for kayaks and canoes as set out in Chapter 7 of the Code, and in particular the following:

  • Chapter 7, Section 7.1 (Training), page 84 of the Code: Undertake a recognised training course in the correct use of the specific type of canoe you wish to use.
  • Chapter 7, Section 7.2 (Prior to entering the water), pages 84 and 85 of the Code: Ensure that you carry a mobile phone or Marine VHF radio in a suitable watertight cover for use to summon assistance in emergency situations.
  • Check the hull is fitted with grab loops/towing lines.
  • Ensure that you are a competent swimmer and capable of surviving in the areas you operate.

The MCIB also recommends that canoeists and kayakers should ensure that they wear clothing and footwear that will not affect their chance of survival in the water.

In addition, Chapter 7 of the Code of Practice contains general information on personal safety equipment, sea kayaking, river kayaking and canoeing.

Part A of the Code outlines the legislative requirements that apply to all recreational craft or specific types or size of craft, and Part B contains recommended guidelines and best practice for the safe operation of a range of recreational craft including canoes and kayaks.

The Code of Practice is a free document and hard copies can be obtained on request, in both English and Irish, from the Maritime Safety Policy Division at
[email protected]

The Code and individual chapters of the Code are available to view or download from dttas.gov.ie and a list of updates to the 2017 edition of the Code is also available.

Marine Notice No 30 of 2020 is available to download below, as is Chapter 7 of the Code of Practice.

Published in Kayaking

The European Court of Justice has ruled the State’s marine incident investigating body is not independent due to the presence of two civil servants on its board.

In a judgment issued late last week, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) said the Marine Casualty Investigation Board’s (MCIB) independence is “not guaranteed” and has awarded costs against Ireland.

Its ruling takes issue with the fact that the five-person MCIB board includes the Department of Transport secretary-general, or his or her deputy, and the Marine Survey Office (MSO) chief surveyor.

The ECJ ruling says that “in view of the functions performed simultaneously” by the two civil servants, Ireland is not fulfilling its obligations under Article 8(1) of Directive 2009/18” governing the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector” .

International maritime lawyer Michael Kingston has called for an “immediate public inquiry” into all investigations by the MCIB.

Mr Kingston, whose father Tim died in the Whiddy island Betelgeuse explosion 41 years ago, has already called for a “root and branch review” of the Department of Transport’s maritime safety directorate.

The Department of Climate Action, Communications and Transport said it is “examining the judgment in the case and is seeking legal advice to address the Court findings and the concerns of the EU Commission”.

The MCIB is responsible under the Merchant Shipping Act and the Merchant Shipping Regulations for conducting safety investigations and for drawing up reports and recommendations.

It is a non-prosecutorial body which does not enforce legislation, and its investigations do not apportion blame or fault.

However, its reports are made public, with recommendations to the Minister for Transport.

It has issued almost 300 reports since its establishment almost 20 years ago on commercial fishing and recreational casualties, and incidents involving ferries, merchant shipping and other vessels.

It published both an interim and final report into the death of Irish Coast Guard volunteer Caitriona Lucas off the Co Clare coast in September, 2016.

In taking the case against Ireland, the European Commission said the MCIB was not independent, on the basis that the responsibilities and activities of both the Department of Transport and the MSO could conflict with the investigative task.

The MSO holds administrative and enforcement functions in relation to ships and fishing vessels, related equipment, and the competence of mariners.

In its defence, Ireland argued that the MCIB reports are independent.

Ireland’s decision to defend the MCIB board’s composition had cost the taxpayer “substantial legal fees”, Mr Kingston said.

Mr Kingston says he has commissioned a formal report by Capt Neil Forde of Marine Hazard Ltd to carry out a review of the investigations, reports and recommendations of the MCIB.

Earlier this year, he made a submission to Garda headquarters seeking a Garda inquiry into the State's role in investigating marine accidents. He was accompanied by Independent TD Mattie McGrath and Anne Marie O’Brien, whose brother John O’Brien and his friend Patrick Esmonde drowned in 2010 off Helvick Head, Co Wexford.

Mr Kingston, who has worked as a consultant to the International Maritime Organisation, also claims that the State had been alerted to malfunctioning of emergency position indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) before the deaths of Paul (49), Kenny (47) and Shane (44) Bolger from Passage East, Co Waterford in Tramore Bay in June 2013.

All three brothers had been wearing lifejackets when their punt capsized. Their emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) signals alerting rescue agencies to their location were not picked up.

The year after the incident, the manufacturer issued a product recall for EPIRBs manufactured between January 2005 and February 2008.

The Department of Transport subsequently confirmed that in 2010 it had contacted the manufacturer over false alerts and battery failures.

Published in MCIB

The need for formal navigation planning has been highlighted in a Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report on the sinking of a West Cork fishing vessel in Ardglass harbour, Co Down last year.

The report on the sinking of the FV Dillon Owen has also highlighted the need for emergency exercise drills to prepare for groundings and collisions.

The 23-metre pelagic vessel registered in Skibbereen, Co Cork, was entering Ardglass harbour to land herring and sprat and refuel in the early hours of October 23rd, 2019 when it lost power and drifted onto rocks at Phennick point.

As Afloat reported at the time, all five crew on board were uninjured and airlifted to safety, and there were unsuccessful attempts by RNLI lifeboats to tow the vessel off the rocks.

The vessel sank over the following days, and the wreck was recovered and sent for demolition. The MCIB report says there was no pollution of the environment.

The report says three distinct events occurred: the initial grounding; the loss of power; and finally the second grounding and sinking of the vessel.

It says the second grounding was caused by the failure of the crew to deploy the primary anchor as the prevailing wind sea direction drove the powerless vessel towards the north shoreline and Phennick Point.

It says the “depth of water here was shallow enough to drop an anchor in order to stop the vessel’s drift”.

“By first focusing on attempts to release the trawl doors the crew lost valuable time,”it notes.

The report cites the “Recommended Practice for Anchor and Mooring Equipment”, which states that “the use of otter boards/trawl doors should only be used if the vessel has lost its anchors”.

“The Dillon Owen had not lost its anchors, and timely release by the crew of the vessel’s primary anchor at this time would likely have averted the vessel’s second grounding at Phennick Point,” it says.

The report says the Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport should issue a marine notice to remind vessel owners and operators to ensure all navigation is planned in adequate detail and with contingency plans, where appropriate.

It also calls on the minister to issue a marine notice “stating that fishing vessel owners and operators develop contingency plans and procedures and conduct emergency exercise drills to prepare for a grounding event or collision incident”.

It says that “where owners and operators of fishing vessels have an anchoring arrangement whereby chain cables are replaced by trawl warps”, crews should “ready anchors for deployment when entering or leaving port by connecting the trawl warp to the free end of the primary anchor chain”.

Published in Fishing

The latest Marine Notice from the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport reminds fishing crews of the dangers associated with boarding and transiting across vessels, especially under the influence of alcohol.

The move is in response to recent reports from the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB), which found that alcohol was a factor in two unrelated incidents in Killybegs, Co Donegal in March 2019 and Rosslare, Co Wexford in May 2019, as reported by Lorna Siggins on Afloat.ie last month.

The notice also reminds of the duty of care on the part of owners and skippers “to provide a safe means of access to vessels while in the harbour and that a gangway or other suitable means, providing an appropriate and safe means of boarding a vessel, shall be made available”.

In addition, all those accessing vessels or working on exposed decks “whether at sea, in harbour or combing two and from moorings” must wear a personal flotation device, or PFD, which “will increase your chance of survival in the event of entering the water”.

The department highlights the risks associated with the consumption of alcohol and/or drug consumption and the dangers associated with boarding and transiting across vessels.

“It is evident from the recent MCIB reports that alcohol consumption continues to be a significant factor in marine incidents,” it says.

“A number of incidents have occurred where diminished human performance due to the effects of alcohol consumption have been primary causes or contributing factors, leading to the loss of life in some cases.

“Alcohol speeds up the rate of body cooling and thus increases the risk of hypothermia in the event that you fall into the water.”

Marine Notice No 25 of 2020 is available to download below.

Published in Water Safety
Tagged under
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Dublin Bay

Dublin Bay on the east coast of Ireland stretches over seven kilometres, from Howth Head on its northern tip to Dalkey Island in the south. It's a place most Dubliners simply take for granted, and one of the capital's least visited places. But there's more going on out there than you'd imagine.

The biggest boating centre is at Dun Laoghaire Harbour on the Bay's south shore that is home to over 1,500 pleasure craft, four waterfront yacht clubs and Ireland's largest marina.

The bay is rather shallow with many sandbanks and rocky outcrops, and was notorious in the past for shipwrecks, especially when the wind was from the east. Until modern times, many ships and their passengers were lost along the treacherous coastline from Howth to Dun Laoghaire, less than a kilometre from shore.

The Bay is a C-shaped inlet of the Irish Sea and is about 10 kilometres wide along its north-south base, and 7 km in length to its apex at the centre of the city of Dublin; stretching from Howth Head in the north to Dalkey Point in the south. North Bull Island is situated in the northwest part of the bay, where one of two major inshore sandbanks lie, and features a 5 km long sandy beach, Dollymount Strand, fronting an internationally recognised wildfowl reserve. Many of the rivers of Dublin reach the Irish Sea at Dublin Bay: the River Liffey, with the River Dodder flow received less than 1 km inland, River Tolka, and various smaller rivers and streams.

Dublin Bay FAQs

There are approximately ten beaches and bathing spots around Dublin Bay: Dollymount Strand; Forty Foot Bathing Place; Half Moon bathing spot; Merrion Strand; Bull Wall; Sandycove Beach; Sandymount Strand; Seapoint; Shelley Banks; Sutton, Burrow Beach

There are slipways on the north side of Dublin Bay at Clontarf, Sutton and on the southside at Dun Laoghaire Harbour, and in Dalkey at Coliemore and Bulloch Harbours.

Dublin Bay is administered by a number of Government Departments, three local authorities and several statutory agencies. Dublin Port Company is in charge of navigation on the Bay.

Dublin Bay is approximately 70 sq kilometres or 7,000 hectares. The Bay is about 10 kilometres wide along its north-south base, and seven km in length east-west to its peak at the centre of the city of Dublin; stretching from Howth Head in the north to Dalkey Point in the south.

Dun Laoghaire Harbour on the southside of the Bay has an East and West Pier, each one kilometre long; this is one of the largest human-made harbours in the world. There also piers or walls at the entrance to the River Liffey at Dublin city known as the Great North and South Walls. Other harbours on the Bay include Bulloch Harbour and Coliemore Harbours both at Dalkey.

There are two marinas on Dublin Bay. Ireland's largest marina with over 800 berths is on the southern shore at Dun Laoghaire Harbour. The other is at Poolbeg Yacht and Boat Club on the River Liffey close to Dublin City.

Car and passenger Ferries operate from Dublin Port to the UK, Isle of Man and France. A passenger ferry operates from Dun Laoghaire Harbour to Howth as well as providing tourist voyages around the bay.

Dublin Bay has two Islands. Bull Island at Clontarf and Dalkey Island on the southern shore of the Bay.

The River Liffey flows through Dublin city and into the Bay. Its tributaries include the River Dodder, the River Poddle and the River Camac.

Dollymount, Burrow and Seapoint beaches

Approximately 1,500 boats from small dinghies to motorboats to ocean-going yachts. The vast majority, over 1,000, are moored at Dun Laoghaire Harbour which is Ireland's boating capital.

In 1981, UNESCO recognised the importance of Dublin Bay by designating North Bull Island as a Biosphere because of its rare and internationally important habitats and species of wildlife. To support sustainable development, UNESCO’s concept of a Biosphere has evolved to include not just areas of ecological value but also the areas around them and the communities that live and work within these areas. There have since been additional international and national designations, covering much of Dublin Bay, to ensure the protection of its water quality and biodiversity. To fulfil these broader management aims for the ecosystem, the Biosphere was expanded in 2015. The Biosphere now covers Dublin Bay, reflecting its significant environmental, economic, cultural and tourism importance, and extends to over 300km² to include the bay, the shore and nearby residential areas.

On the Southside at Dun Laoghaire, there is the National Yacht Club, Royal St. George Yacht Club, Royal Irish Yacht Club and Dun Laoghaire Motor Yacht Club as well as Dublin Bay Sailing Club. In the city centre, there is Poolbeg Yacht and Boat Club. On the Northside of Dublin, there is Clontarf Yacht and Boat Club and Sutton Dinghy Club. While not on Dublin Bay, Howth Yacht Club is the major north Dublin Sailing centre.

© Afloat 2020