The Marine Casualty Investigation Board has recommended that the Minister for Transport should amend or update the Code of Practice for the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft to advise owners to ensure that auxiliary engines fitted to racing yachts provide the necessary power to allow safe inshore or coastal passage, particularly when adverse weather or sea conditions prevail.

This recommendation is included in the MCIB report into the fire which burnt and sank the yacht Black Magic in Ringabella Bay off Cork Harbour in December 2021.

The MCIB also says the Minister for Transport should publish a Marine Notice highlighting the risks associated with refuelling operations or decanting volatile flammable liquids at sea or alongside, to or from open containers in the vicinity of hot and exposed surfaces.

The smoke plume clearly visible from the shore

The yacht Black Magic with one person onboard, sailed from Crosshaven, Co Cork, for Kinsale Harbour at about 10.30 a.m. on December 13, 2021, but an hour-and-a-quarter later off Cork Harbour the outboard engine on the transom of the yacht, caught fire which spread rapidly. The Skipper called for help in a ‘Mayday’ message on VHF. A fishing boat in the vicinity relayed this to the Coast Guard at Valentia. Another fishing vessel rescued the Skipper at approximately 12.00 hrs, and a Port of Cork RIB that responded to the ‘Mayday’ took him ashore. He was not injured. The yacht sank at 12.48 pm at Ringabella Bay.

The MCIB report makes three findings, concluding that “the continuous operation of the outboard engine onboard yacht Black Magic as it made the passage from Crosshaven marina to the vicinity off Ringabella Bay at the engine’s maximum design capacity caused the engine to suffer a significant mechanical failure such that hot engine components were exposed to petrol fuel and oil lubricants which spontaneously ignited and caused a fire onboard. This consumed the vessel which subsequently sank off Ringabella Bay. 

“The lack of wind and the sub-optimal capacity of the yacht’s outboard engine to power the yacht at the required speed as it motor sailed out of Cork Harbour was a contributory factor in the loss of yacht Black Magic.

Black Magic on fire. Photo: courtesy Cian O'Connor

“Refuelling the outboard engine by topping up the engine’s fuel tank likely resulted in a fuel spillage in the vicinity of the engine and transom. The spilt fuel was likely to have been a contributory factor in the subsequent fire, which started at the outboard engine and resulted in the loss of the yacht.”

The Skipper, who is not named, having read the report, commented to the MCIB that the yacht was “extremely light” and the outboard, which the MCIB identified as a PARSUN 3 horsepower, single cylinder 4-stroke, mounted on a transom bracket was sufficient to push her in the flat calm waters on the day. He said  that he was “hugging the coast in flat calm and zero wind” and had raised the mainsail at the RCYC marina. He said that it took him “a long time to get over this, and was having nightmares for a long time.”

The full investigation report is available on the MCIB website here and see a vid of the burning yacht on youtube here

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report into the death of a Donegal student during a kayaking trip in Co Kerry has said the outing was not properly assessed for risk.

Aisling O’Connor, 21, from Ballyshannon, Co Donegal, drowned after she became trapped under a tree branch in the Upper Caragh river near Glencar, Co Kerry, on November 2nd, 2019.

She was among a party of 27 on a trip organised by the University of Limerick (UL) Kayak Club.

The UL biochemistry student was resuscitated and transferred by helicopter to University Hospital Kerry, but she died two days later.

Another kayaker required medical resuscitation and hospitalisation, and the MCIB described his situation as “a near fatality”.

The 202-page MCIB report called on the UL Kayak Club to “immediately review its procedures and assessments prior to embarking on group river activities” and to examine its procedures in relation to Canoeing Ireland (CI) standards.

It has also recommended the kayak club should “suspend its activities until its safety regime is audited to a standard acceptable to Canoeing Ireland”.

The report says the prevailing conditions, including the features of the river, were “not suitable for all the members of the trip to manage safely”.

It says the trip was” not properly assessed for the risks attached to the prevailing conditions and having regard to the skills and experience of the group taking part in what is a high-risk sport”.

It says those in charge of identifying and assessing the risks in advance, and on the day, were “insufficiently trained and experienced themselves to be able to assess the risks given the combined factors of river conditions and the nature of the group”.

It says this arose as there was “a lack of adherence to the ULKC Safety Statement 2014 and the Trips Policy and Procedure which set out control measures, which led to a lack of accredited training, which in turn led to poor decision making”.

It says that had there being CI- qualified instructors available (or persons with recognisable equivalent training and experience) they “would have identified that the group was too large and its makeup too inexperienced and would not have approved a trip that involved a group of beginners in those conditions, and/or, having embarked would have realised that the conditions being experienced were not suitable and would have terminated the trip”.

It says the gaps in the club safety environment were “contributed to by the lack of any supervision/audit, or capacity to effectively supervise or audit, of the safety of university students engaged in high risk activities by the UL Students’ Union, and by the absence of any overarching, agreed, and communicated, spheres of responsibility between the ULSU and UL, leading to an environment at club level where there was a serious disregard of the ULKC Safety Statement 2014 and Trips Policy and Procedure, and CI recommended standards”.

The report notes that the Upper Caragh River was” a Grade 4 river on the day and a Grade 3 with parts at Grade 4 normally”.

“The river trip planners and leaders did not correctly gauge the river as a Grade 4 river despite the elevated river levels,” it says.

“The recent heavy rains in the locality resulted in the river level being higher, current flows being considerably faster and more powerful to the degree that the intermediate paddlers had difficulties in controlling their boats,”it says, noting that two casualties – one of whom died - were intermediates at Level 2 and Level 3 Skills competency.

The MCIB report says that “river trip planners and leaders made no risk assessment for the river trip on the Upper Caragh River”.

“Had they done so, the assessment of the corrected river grade that day (Grade 4) would have significantly affected the planning of the river trip process and either altered the composition of the river trip groups and/or the conduct of the river trip or may have re-directed the trip to a more suitable venue,” it says.

“ The absence of a comprehensive risk assessment was a causative factor in the capsize incidents,”it says and the kayak club’s 2014 safety statement was not adhered to.

The report says the absence of a contingency plan in the event of the leaders and seconds requiring closer supervision of an increased number of inexperienced kayakers due to the prevailing river conditions was a “contributory factor” in this incident.

The MCIB report makes a number of recommendations for UL Kayak Club, UL Students’ Union and UL, along with the Minister for Transport and Canoeing Ireland.

In its comment on the draft report, the UL Kayak Club defended planning for the trip.

In a joint statement, UL Student Life and University of Limerick said they were “extremely conscious of the heart-breaking loss of life at the centre of this tragic accident”.

“We remain absolutely committed to the health, well-being and safety of our student community of over 18,000 students,” they said.

“The MCIB report into the incident which occurred during a planned outing of the UL Kayaking Club in November 2019 contains recommendations that are relevant to UL Student Life, the UL Kayaking Club, University of Limerick, Canoeing Ireland and the Minister for Transport,” they said.

“UL Student Life and UL have and will continue to work together to consider the findings of the final MCIB Report and to implement the recommendations so that the highest possible safety standards are in place within all clubs to which our students are affiliated,” they said.

“While this was a most tragic accident, it is acknowledged that lessons can and will be learned as well as improvements made to ensure the safety of our student community,” they said.

A link to the full report is here

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) has initiated an inquiry into a recent incident on the river Corrib where up to ten people were rescued after their rowing craft were swept towards the Galway city salmon weir.

The incident was one of two which occurred on the river on January 14th when the river was in full flow and three rowing boats attached to the University of Galway and to Coláiste Iognáid secondary school capsized.

No one was injured, but Labour councillor and chairman of Claddagh Watch river safety group Niall McNelis said the situation involving the university students who were caught on the top of the weir was potentially very serious.

The sport of rowing is exempt from mandatory lifejacket use.

The MCIB confirmed early this week that it decided to carry out an investigation into this incident.

“A full report will be published in due course”, an MCIB spokeswoman confirmed, adding that the board “will not be making any further comment”.

As Afloat reported earlier, both incidents occurred between 11 am and 12 noon on January 14th, with the first being the capsize of an octuple or “eight” rowing craft with students from Coláiste Iognáid or “ Jez” secondary school.

The capsize occurred up river from the weir and across from their clubhouse. All students were rescued by their club safety launches within minutes and taken ashore.

A more serious incident occurred shortly after that when two rowing craft with University of Galway students were swept towards the salmon weir, where they were caught by pontoons and capsized due to the strength of the river flow.

Ten rowers - none of whom are obliged to wear lifejackets due to the sport’s exemption - had to be taken from the top of the weir by club safety launches in very challenging conditions.

The Irish Coast Guard confirmed that its Valentia Rescue Coordination Centre was alerted through the national 112/999 call answering service at 12:08hrs on January 14. It said it was reported that ten rowers were “possibly in difficulty at the weir”.

The Galway Fire Service, An Garda Siochana, Coast Guard Helicopter R118 from Sligo, Galway RNLIlLifeboat and Costelloe Bay Coast Guard unit were tasked, it said.

“During the 112/999 call the caller confirmed all boat occupants had been recovered to the club safety boats responding locally,”the Irish Coast Guard said, and rescue units were stood down.

The University of Galway is compiling an internal report. It said support boats were on the water at the time the two boats capsized and no-one was injured.

“ All rowers were brought safely from the water to the river bank within minutes,” a spokesman said.

“The university is deeply grateful to other rowing clubs for their support and prompt response. We also thank the emergency services for their rapid response,”he said.

He confirmed the university has engaged with Rowing Ireland, the national representative body, and is reviewing all safety measures and precautions which are in place for our rowing club and other river users”.

It said it would cooperate fully with any MCIB inquiry, and would support any initiatives to improve water safety and rescue services on the Corrib.

A spokesman for Coláiste Iognáid said that it was satisfied that all safety procedures were followed when its boat capsized, and said all students were fine and parents were informed.

Speaking on behalf of the Galway water users’ multi-agency group, RNLI Galway operations manager Mike Swan said that a dedicated rescue craft above the weir which was on call “24/7” was essential.

Corrib Rowing and Yachting Club said it supported calls for a dedicated rescue boat, as the nearest service up river is the Corrib-Mask Rescue Service in Lisloughrey, Co Mayo.

A fuel leak is believed to have caused a fire on board a passenger ferry linking Ballyhack, Co Wexford with Passage East in Waterford, last year.

A Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report says the crew of the Frazer Tintern reacted immediately after the master of the vessel detected a strong smell of diesel fuel while en route to Passage East in early August 2021.

A crew member had also called the master to say he could also detect a strong smell of the fuel and was going to investigate. The incident occurred at around 18.05 hours on August 5th, 2021.

The MCIB report says that when the crew member got to the mesh door at the number one (No.1) engine compartment, he was met with black smoke and flames.

“The crewmember notified the master straight away that they had a fire onboard. The master immediately shut down the No.1 engine and turned off the engine room fans,” it says.

“Two crewmembers then activated two portable fire extinguishers and rigged fire hoses to provide boundary cooling,”it says.

The vessel continued to the Passage East slipway to get passengers off as quickly and safely as possible, it says, although the fire was brought under control.

It says that on arrival, all passengers and vehicles were “disembarked in a safe manner”.

“The vessel was then secured, and the remaining engines shut down. When the smoke dispersed fully, the crew investigated the engine room to confirm the fire had been extinguished,”it says.

The two-deck crewmembers used portable fire extinguishers, the fire was knocked back, and fire hoses were run out to provide boundary cooling while the master continued to navigate the vessel towards Passage East slipway, it says.

The report says that the machinery space fire suppression system was not operated. The vessel was moored up, and the remaining engines were shut down.

“The three crewmembers then carried out a visual inspection of the engine compartment after the remaining smoke had dispersed and confirmed that the fire was fully extinguished,” it says.

The MCIB report says the fire was “most likely caused by a return line fuel leak on No.1 main engine providing fuel to the area”.

It says that the volume and pressure of the fuel was greatly increased by the fuel return line being blocked or shut off, while the ambient high temperature and swirling airflow in the vicinity assisted in the atomisation of the fuel.

It says the fuel may have been ignited by arcing of the No.1 main engine alternator, but it was more likely to have been from fuel spraying onto hot surfaces such as the engine exhaust manifold or turbocharger casing.

It says that shutting down the engine removed the source of fuel from the fire and would have had a far greater effect in extinguishing it than the use of portable extinguishers.

It says that due to the extent of the fire and subsequent damage to No.1 engine, “the exact location and cause of the fuel leak has been impossible to determine”.

It recommends that the owners/operators should ensure that all return line flexible fuel hoses are fixed as per the engine manufacturer’s recommendations.

It also says the owners/operators should arrange to have the airflow from the machinery space ducted away from the main car deck and clear of any public areas. This is to ensure that a fire in the machinery space will not impinge on public areas.

It says the owners/operators should arrange to have the shut-off valves removed from the fuel system return lines to prevent the potential of over-pressurisation of the system. It also recommends that they need to ensure that the firefighting procedures and domestic safety management systems put in place post the incident are “followed and practiced and logged regularly”.

The MCIB reports recommends that the Minister for Transport should issue a marine notice to owners/masters of passenger vessels to remind them that “in the case of a fire or other potentially serious incident a distress/Pan Pan call as appropriate should be made at the earliest opportunity”.

It also says the minister should request a review of manning and crew qualification requirements for Class IV passenger vessels operating in restricted waters as per action 25 of the Maritime Safety Strategy of 2015.

It notes that the owners initiated an internal enquiry into the incident immediately before any repairs were undertaken.

“ This enquiry yielded some useful information on the history of the event”, the MCIB says, but it "did not clearly identify the root cause of the fire".

It says it did lead to the operators adopting a safety management system to improve processes onboard.

It says that since the incident, the door leading to No.1 engine compartment on the ferry was fitted with a weight and magnetic lock so that it closes automatically when the fire alarm is activated.

The board of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) says it welcomes the publication of the General Scheme of Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Accidents) Bill 2022 and the Government’s decision to establish a new independent Marine Accident Investigation Unit (MAIU) within the Department of Transport.

“The board believes that the new proposed structure and the potential for greater synergy with other investigation units within the department’s remit will enhance future investigations of marine casualties and thereby contribute to greater marine safety,” it said in a statement on Tuesday (13 December).

Restrictions on the membership of the board which arose following a European Court of Justice decision in 2020 were resolved by the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Accidents) Act 2022, the board adds.

In February this year, the board completed a recruitment drive for additional investigators to the investigator panel “which comprises independent persons with a high level of technical expertise”.

In September, this was followed by a recruitment process for a full-time expert marine consultant for the MCIB, which is ongoing.

The board says this is in line with recommendations in the review of the organisational structures underpinning marine accident investigations commissioned by the Department of Transport.

It adds that it has “assured the minister and the department of its full support and cooperation to ensure continuity for ongoing and new investigations and to enable a smooth transition of the function of investigating marine casualties from the board to the new unit which will be established by the current bill.”

This story was updated on Wednesday 14 December with a link to the bill.

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) has said all ship crew and vessel operators need to be reminded of the potential dangers of working at height following its inquiry into a fall from an Irish cargo ship.

A 29-year-old Polish national working as a second officer with Arklow Shipping was seriously injured after he fell from the Arklow Clan, an 87.4 metre-long general cargo ship, while it was berthed in Aberdeen, Scotland.

The incident occurred at around 17.49 hours on August 11th 2021, while the ship, in ballast condition, was due to unload a cargo of scrap metal the following morning.

Three crewmembers had begun lowering the walkway handrails in preparation for loading operations.

Whilst lowering the handrails, the second officer lost his footing, falling around 3.6 metres (m) from the walkway to the quay below.

As a result of the impact, he sustained serious injuries to both his legs, necessitating an extensive period of hospitalisation, multiple surgeries, and rehabilitation. The man had two years of service with Arklow Shipping, and it was his second contract onboard the Arklow Clan.

Investigations into the cause of the incident were undertaken by Arklow Shipping, the vessel’s crew and Port of Aberdeen staff.

Britain’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) and the MCIB were both notified by the master/ship Operator, with the MCIB subsequently investigating the incident.

The MCIB report says that working at height remains one of the biggest causes of fatalities and major injuries onboard vessels.

“ All the major P&I clubs (vessel insurers) have issued loss prevention circulars identifying the dangers of working at height both above and below deck,”it says.

“ A failure to adequately identify work hazards, poor planning and supervision remain contributory factors in the majority of working at height incidents,”it says.

It notes that onboard the Arklow Clan, it was “common practice not to wear harnesses when dropping the railings”.

“This culture and compliancy does not appear to be limited to the vessel, as an incident regarding lowered walkway handrails also occurred onboard the Arklow Vanguard, it says.

It says the lack of safety wires onboard 16 other vessels in the Arklow fleet was “persuasive evidence that the risks associated with handrail lowering operation were not appreciated by the crews or the vessel operator. In other words, the lack of a wire was not reported or deemed to constitute a hazard”.

The MCIB report says that Arklow Shipping identified the cause and rectified it quickly. It distributed a fleet circular letter on August 31st, 2021, advising all crew of the incidents at Manchester and Aberdeen with the walkway handrails.

“ The circular acknowledged the inadequacies of the procedures for lowering the handrails and set out new requirements,”it says.

The owner of the vessel, Arklow Shipping ULC, has said it accepts the report’s findings in a submission sent to the MCIB.

The MCIB says that the Minister for Transport should issue a marine notice to remind all crews and vessel operators of the potential dangers of working at height and their obligations to follow existing legislation and guidance in order to reduce any risks.

“This includes ensuring the task is risk assessed, subject to a permit to work, that crew are provided with a “toolbox talk” prior to commencing the task and the appropriate personal protection equipment( PPE) is available,” it says.

“ Crew must be provided with training in the correct use of PPE, and the PPE must be subject to regular inspections and recorded in a planned maintenance system, as per International Safety Management (ISM) Code (applicable to passenger ships and cargo vessels over 500 gross tonnes),” the report says.

The report is here

The quick action of a crew member on a Donegal fishing vessel probably saved the life of his skipper when his arm was trapped by a trawl door, an investigation has found.

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report into the incident involving the whitefish trawler FV Marliona has noted that the trawl door was not secured adequately and that it was in the wrong position.

This made it prone to movement from side to side. At the time of the incident, the vessel was taking a slight roll, adding to this movement, the MCIB report notes. These factors, along with fatigue, were probable causes.

The incident occurred on the afternoon of February 3rd, 2021, when the Marliona was alongside Greencastle harbour, Co Donegal.

During a repair procedure, the skipper’s left arm became trapped by a trawl door, causing severe damage to his arm.

First aid was administered by another crewmember and the bleeding was stopped. The skipper was transferred by ambulance to hospital for his injuries, and his arm was saved. He was released the same day, but continued to receive treatment and only returned to work in May 2021.

The “FV Marliona” is a white fish trawler that mainly fishes to the west and north of Donegal.

On February 3rd, 2021 the vessel had been fishing off the west coast of Donegal and had returned to the port of Greencastle, Co Donegal to unload its catch and repair its fishing gear. Its registered owner is Marliona Fishing Ltd.

In its analysis, the report noted that during the repairs, the trawl door was lower than normal, and so the skipper had to reach down lower to grab the chain-link.

It said “the absence of a risk assessment for this operation and the incorrect positioning of the trawl door were causative factors”, and the unstable trawl door and the vessel’s roll trapped the skipper’s arm.

It said that the casualty was “in serious risk of bleeding out in a short time, but due to the quick action of crewmember B he got critical attention that probably saved his life”

The crew member had recently completed a three day first aid course which was a “major factor”, the MCIB report said.

The report concluded that the operation should have been done on the quay wall, i.e., the door should have been landed onto the quay and the chain-link removed there.

It said that time sheets were inspected for the vessel, and inconsistencies were noted, but the MCIB “can make no finding about compliance or non-compliance with the regulations as that is within the jurisdiction of the Marine Survey Office.

“ Irrespective of whether there was or was not compliance with the regulations, it cannot be discounted that fatigue may have been a contributory human factor, it said.

“It is likely that another human factor was that of time pressure to effect the repairs during a limited time in port before the next fishing trip,”it said

The report made eight recommendations, including recommending that the Minister for Transport should issue a marine notice reminding fishing vessel owners and operators of the great importance of safety and risk assessments, and that these assessments and methodology are communicated fully and should involve interpreters if required.

Recommendations also included calling on the Minister for Transport to review existing health and safety training of fishers in light of this report.

It said the Minister for Transport should ensure that the Marine Survey Office has the capacity for the audit of working time to ensure compliance with relevant regulations, and to ensure adherence to the requirements in S.I. No. 591/2021 EU (Minimum Safety and Health Requirements for Improved Medical Treatment on Board Vessels) Regulations 2021.

The MCIB was established in 2002 under the Merchant shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000. The purpose of the MCIB is to investigate marine casualties with a view to learning lessons to prevent them happening again.

It is not the purpose of an investigation to attribute fault or blame. The MCIB invites applications from suitably qualified marine consultants to enhance the technical skills within the MCIB Secretariat, support investigations and investigators, and provide technical advice to the Board as required.

To date, the MCIB has published approximately 254 accident investigation reports through independent investigators appointed by the MCIB to carry out accident investigations on its behalf and to develop reports for the MCIB.

Investigators are appointed from a panel and have a variety of highly technical maritime qualifications and skills. You will require the ability to communicate at all levels, from providing expert advice to the Board through to working with investigators and engaging in cooperative activity with the European Union wide network of maritime investigation units, and with other bodies interested in marine safety.

Details about the MCIB, its annual reports and its investigation reports can be accessed at www.mcib.ie.

As an Expert Marine Consultant to the Board, you will be required to:

• Provide expert technical advice to the Board on a broad range of diverse Marine Casualties.
• Co-ordinate a panel of investigators ensuring that marine casualties are investigated in accordance with the relevant legislation including the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000, the IMO code, EU Directive 2009/18/EC and S.I. 276 of 2011 – European Communities (Merchant Shipping) (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 2011 and the EU Common Methodology.
• Monitor and ensure that all incident investigations are conducted thoroughly and effectively and that they meet the requirements and expectations of the Board and are in accordance with national and international regulations, including providing guidance to the Board on the direction for the conduct of investigations.
• Act as investigator under warrant from time to time as appointed by the Board.
• Carry out other investigator type functions as may be determined by the MCIB from time to time including acting as a support or providing assistance to the investigator appointed under warrant, and/or co-operating on another investigation or report.
• Liaise with the Board and the Secretariat regarding investigation progress and presentation of reports in the required format.
• Take part in activities arising from the MCIB’s membership of the European Union's European Maritime Safety Agency (“EMSA”). This will include taking part in EMSA training and also any audits or assessments carried out by the EU/EMSA or IMO as required.
• Take part in MCIB training and in general activities arising from the MCIB’s own audit or governance activities.
• Contribute to the work of the MCIB in engagement with other entities interested in marine safety and other entities.
• Any other duties and responsibilities deemed necessary by the Board.

For more information, and to apply, see www.etenders.gov.ie and search ID number 220892 or click this link here

The closing date for applications is Tuesday 20th September at 16.00 hrs.

The Chairperson of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board has warned that regulation may well be required for watersports in the leisure marine sector if voluntary standards set by accredited bodies are not adhered to.

That serious warning is contained in the annual report of the Board for last year, which recounts that in its report for 2020, “we strongly encouraged all organisations (especially clubs and commercial entities) associated with watersports and water recreational activities to audit their safety systems and to have regard to all guidelines or recommendations issued by any governing sports bodies.”

Chairperson Claire Callanan says: “It is disappointing to note that in 2021 the MCIB continued to be advised of situations where little or no regard was paid to governing body safety guidelines.”

"little or no regard was paid to governing body safety guidelines"

She says: “A number of recommendations were made in relation to the kayaking/canoeing sector, including ones related to commercial users. These included a recommendation that consideration should be given to the establishment of a directory of commercial providers of coastal sea and river paddle facilities and that consideration should be given to how best to enhance safety standards within the commercial paddle sport provider sector and whether a mandatory registration or licencing scheme, which would provide for the registration of instructors and their qualifications should be introduced.

“We have observed a continuing increase in the number of very serious incidents involving kayakers/canoeists some of which could very easily have led to fatalities.

“Regulation may well be required, especially in the commercial sector, if voluntary standards set by accredited bodies are not adhered to.”

The MCIB report also says that the Board has seen an increase in “incidents involving fishing vessels of all sizes.

“This has also been the assessment of our European Union (EU) partners and is feeding into the draft of a new EU Directive.” 

As a result of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decision in July 2020 (which held that Ireland had not correctly implemented Article 8.1 of Directive 2009/18/EC) the Board of the MCIB has had to operate with only three members. The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) (Amendment) Bill 2021 was presented to the Dáil on 11 November 2021 and passed its final stages in the Seanad on 5 May 2022. The Act will facilitate an increased composition of the Board based on a minimum of five and a maximum of seven members appointed by the Minister, along with other necessary operational and technical revisions to support the ongoing functioning of the Board.

The Chairperson comments in her annual statement: “The Board looks forward to the appointment of additional Board members at the earliest opportunity.”

In response to recommendations in the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report into the fatal incident involving the FV Myia in Galway Bay in November 2020, as previously reported on Afloat.ie, the Department of Transport is stressing the importance of navigation planning.

The necessity of ensuring all navigation is planned in detail from berth to berth, with contingency plans in place, applies to all concerned in the fishing industry.

Owners and relevant crew members need to familiarise themselves with their vessel, including its anchoring arrangements and any limitations of the anchoring equipment.

Owners and masters are also reminded that an efficient navigational watch shall be maintained throughout the voyage in line with the Basic Principles to be observed in keeping a Navigational Watch on Board Fishing Vessels as set out IMO Resolution A.484 (XII). Situational awareness with regard to navigation shall be maintained at all times.

All voyages must be planned using the most up to date nautical publications and approved admiralty charts and/or ECDIS. It is essential to carry out regular weather forecast checks during coastal, offshore and ocean voyages.

Shipowners, masters, skippers and fishers should particularly consider the following points when planning on going to sea:

• Weather: Prior to proceeding to sea, weather forecasts shall be assessed and the means to obtain available weather forecast updates shall be ensured. The prevailing weather shall be monitored at all times. Where weather conditions are deteriorating and the safety of the vessel or crew is in question, operators should seek shelter or return to port.
• Tides: The state of the tide and current should be determined for the planned voyage, task or activity. Masters and skippers shall ensure that the vessel or craft can be safely operated in the states of expected tide or current.
• Limitations of the vessel: Ensure the vessel is suitable for the planned voyage, task or activity, that all systems are available and in good operational condition, including all appropriate safety systems and equipment which shall, at all times, be ready for immediate use.
• Crew: Take into account the experience and physical ability of the crew. Crews suffering from cold, tiredness and seasickness won’t be able to do their job properly and this could result in an overburdened skipper. Prior to proceeding to sea, crew members should be well rested, fit and physically capable for any task that they may be required to perform whilst onboard. Masters and skippers should be aware of dangers of, and be able to recognise, fatigue and its impact on the safety of the vessel or craft.
• Communications: VHF radio should be available onboard which is capable of operating on marine band Channel 16 to raise a distress and/or seek assistance. Skippers should not rely on mobile phones as signal availability can be reduced or lost due to range from shore and environmental conditions. Skippers should, prior to departure, advise the port authority or a designated person ashore of planned area of operation and expected time of return.