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The search for a fisherman missing after a small fishing vessel with two on board sank off the coast of Co Louth on Tuesday morning (12 December) has been called off for the night.

RTÉ News reports that a second fisherman was rescued after the incident north of Dunany Point in Dundalk Bay, and is being treated at Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital in Drogheda.

A multi-agency search and rescue operation was launched following at Mayday call at 8.45am from the fishermen’s vessel, with lifeboat and coastguard teams from Clogherhead and Greenore joining the Dublin-based Irish Coast Guard helicopter Rescue 116 at the scene.

Clogherhead RNLI says the search will resume on Wednesday morning (13 December), adding: “We are thinking of the family of the fisherman at this difficult time.”

Published in Fishing

A new award named after Rescue 116 pilot Capt Dara Fitzpatrick has been presented to a paramedic who was one of the first responders at the explosion in Creeslough, Co Donegal, last October.

As The Irish Examiner reports, paramedic Frances Griffin was selected for the award initiated by the Irish Paramedicine Education and Research Network (IPERN) at the University of Limerick.

Griffin, who is from Creeslough, was one of the first on the scene after the explosion, which claimed ten lives. She was involved in removing the most seriously injured person from the rubble, and treated and stabilised another seriously injured person. Both of the casualties survived.

Griffin, who works with the National Ambulance Service, was nominated for the award by her colleague, Roddy Smith.

As Afloat reported earlier, also nominated was RNLI Sligo lifeboat helm Eithne Davis who has launched on service 164 times and has been directly involved in saving nine lives while assisting in bringing 131 people at sea to safety.

  • Eunice Langley, who founded Defibrillation and Resuscitation Access (DARA) in 2007.
  • Finola Lafferty, who was nominated for her leadership in overseas deployments and compassion in civilian care during the Covid-19 pandemic.
  • Michelle O’Toole, an advanced paramedic, was nominated for her work on supporting the mental health of first responders and their families.

The award ceremony took place on International Women’s Day, and it was presented to Ms Griffin by Capt Fitzpatrick’s sister, Orla. Just 16 per cent of advanced paramedics are female.

Capt Dara Fitzpatrick, Capt Mark Duffy, winch crew Ciarán Smith and Paul Ormsby lost their lives when their Sikorsky S-92 helicopter crashed at Blackrock island off the north Mayo coast on March 14th, 2017.

“Captain Fitzpatrick was an inspirational female leader in her role with the Irish Coast Guard — she left behind a powerful legacy which has inspired me and my female colleagues in pre-hospital care,” Griffin said.

IPERN chairwoman Niamh Cummins described Griffin’s nomination as “particularly powerful” out of the “five amazing finalists”.

“She’s just been fabulous across her career, she’s done so much work in the community and supporting her colleagues and particularly Creeslough,” she said.

Read more in The Irish Examiner here

Published in Rescue
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A jury at the Rescue 116 helicopter crash inquest has returned verdicts of accidental death for all four air crew – Capt Dara Fitzpatrick, Capt Mark Duffy and winch crew Paul Ormsby and Ciarán Smith.

As RTÉ news reports, the jury at the coroner’s court in Belmullet, Co Mayo, delivered verdicts on Thursday morning after considering evidence for over an hour and a half.

Evidence from a number of witnesses had been heard by coroner Dr Eleanor Fitzgerald at a resumed hearing on Wednesday, June 1st.

The inquest had opened in April 2018, a year after the crash in which all four air crew lost their lives when their Sikorsky S-92 crashed at Blackrock island, west of the Blacksod lighthouse refuelling point in north Mayo. It was adjourned pending completion of investigations by the Garda and Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU).

The bodies of the two winch crew have not been found.

The initial hearing had also heard that Capt Fitzpatrick died as a result of drowning, and Capt Duffy sustained fatal injuries as a result of the crash.

The decision by a Malin Coast Guard radio officer to task the Sligo based Rescue 118 helicopter, to evacuate an injured fisherman from the Scottish vessel Kings Cross 140 km west of Eagle Island, Co Mayo.

Crewman John James Strachan had severed his thumb when hauling nets on the night of March 13th 2017.

Mr Scott outlined how he had tried to secure top cover by the Air Corps and that he also "tried to get a Nimrod from the UK" but this was not available.

Rescue 116 was then asked to provide top cover and flew from Dublin. It was approaching Blacksod to refuel when it crashed at Blackrock island, west of Blacksod.

Mr Scott told the inquest that a doctor he had consulted did not object to his decision to take the injured crewman ashore.

He said he used his judgement, accrued over 42 years, and said “in my opinion the man needed off the vessel".

Mr Scott told the inquest he would make the same decision today.

Garda Supt Gary Walsh read a deposition from the captain of the Kings Cross fishing vessel, William Buchan, describing how crewman John James Strachan sustained a severed thumb when he was hauling in nets on the night of March 13th, 2017 when the vessel was 140 nautical miles west of Eagle Island.

Mr Buchan recalled hauling at about 9.15pm on March 13th, 2017 after five or six hours on blue whiting. Mr Strachan’s hand got caught, and he managed to get his hand ot of his glove but half of his thumb had been crushed and was inside the glove. He said they put the thumb top in the ship’s freezer.

Cork University emergency registrar Dr Mai Nguyen, who was consulted about the injury on the night of the call-out, told the inquest she felt the decision to task had been made before she was called. She described the injury as “minor”, and said she would not have sent the Irish Cost Guard as there was no hope of re-attaching the severed thumb and they were far from the coast.

A recording of calls between the Kings Cross vessel, Malin Coast Guard and Dr Nguyen confirmed this at the inquest.

After Dr Nguyen advised skipper, William Buchan on how to handle the casualty, she asked the radio officer if a “medevac” was being carried out and he said it was.

The inquest also heard that in the minutes before the Rescue 116 helicopter was due to land at Blacksod lighthouse helipad to refuel, visibility "dropped fast".

Lightkeeper Vincent Sweeney described how in the minutes before Rescue 116 was due to land to refuel, visibility "dropped fast", to the point that "you'd hardly see your arm in front of you".

There were 42 recommendations in the 350-page final AAIU report published last November - 19 applying to the air crew’s employer, CHC Ireland, which holds the Irish Coast Guard contract for four helicopter search and rescue bases.

The AAIU report found the “probable” cause of the crash was a combination of poor weather, the helicopter’s altitude and the crew being unaware of a 282 ft obstacle – as in Blackrock island – on a pre-programmed route guide to Blacksod.

Series of recommendations

The jury made a series of recommendations at the resumed inquest.

The jury foreman called for “definitive medical criteria informing any decision to dispatch an emergency helicopter.”

“There should be no ambiguity as to who the decision-maker is.

“There should be reliable top cover available at all times ideally not using another SARs aircraft. Based on clear evidence, errors in mapping and navigation aids contributed significantly to this accident,”he said.

“There needs to be cohesive oversight in relation to the various bodies and agencies who bear collective responsibility for the provision of these services,” he said.

“In making this statement, we wish to acknowledge the painstaking work undertaken by An Garda Síochána, the Air Accident Investigation Unit, the judicial and the many other agencies,”he said.

“We further wish to acknowledge the strength of those individuals who gave evidence and to the families and friends of the victims who have, for these past five years, been forced to relieve these harrowing experiences for the purposes of seeking the truth of these events,”he said.

“The burden of responsibility we collectively feel as a jury towards those who continue to operate on the front line of the rescue services, their families and to those lost in service cannot be overstated,” he said.

“We wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge the heroic efforts of the rescue services in the protection of the public on a daily basis,”he said.

“We offer our sincere sympathies to the family and loved ones of Dara Fitzpatrick, Mark Duffy, Paul Ormsby and Ciaran Smith,” he said.

“Ar dheis Dé go raibh a h-anam dilís.”

Coroner Dr Eleanor Fitzgerald thanked the jury for their service and diligence and said “this tragic accident and the loss of four people occurred from a multiplicity of factors and in normal conditions, this accident would not have happened”.

“But in their line of duty, is there such a thing as normal? In undertaking search-and-rescue missions there is always some risk involved,”she said.

“However, in this particular tragedy there were a few contributing factors,” Dr Fitzgerald.

Dr Fitzgerald described the conditions that night as “treacherous”.

Barrister Derek Ryan, representing  Ciaran Smith’s widow Martina, their children Caitlin, Shannon and Finlay, his parents Michael and Teresa and his brother and sister,thanked the coroner, the jury and the Garda for their work.

“A very difficult matter has been dealt with efficiently and very sensitively by everyone involved and for that, thank you,”  Mr Ryan said.

He paid tribute to the witnesses who gave “sometimes very difficult statements to this coroners court”.

“Ciaran’s family wish to thank all those involved in the original searches back in 2017, An Garda Síochána, the RNLI, the Coast Guard, Ciaran’s friends and colleagues, the military services, local boat owners and local fisherman.”

Mr Ryan also extended the Smith family’s thanks to the local people of the Belmullet area “who extended such kindness to Ciaran’s family at a very difficult time”.

Capt Dara Fitzpatrick’s father, John Fitzpatrick, concurred with the comments of the Smith family.

Read the RTÉ News report here

Published in Coastguard
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A Coast Guard radio officer has defended his decision to request a medical evacuation for an injured fisherman off the west coast on the night that the Irish Coast Guard Rescue 116 helicopter crashed with the loss of four lives.

All four crew- Capt Dara Fitzpatrick, Capt Mark Duffy, winch crew Paul Ormsby and Ciarán Smith – died when their Sikorsky S-92 helicopter crashed at Blackrock island in the early hours of March 14th, 2017.

The Dublin-based helicopter had been asked to provide “top cover” or communications for the Sligo-based Rescue 118 helicopter which was tasked to airlift a fisherman with an injured thumb from a vessel 140 km off the Mayo coast.

At a resumed inquest in Belmullet, Co Mayo, coroner Dr Eleanor Fitzgerald was told by Malin Head Coast Guard radio office Ian Scott that the casualty was bleeding out, in severe pain and had a section of his thumb amputated.

As RTÉ News reports, Mr Scott outlined how he had tried to secure top cover by the Air Corps and that he also "tried to get a Nimrod from the UK" but this was not available.

Rescue 116 was then asked to provide top cover and flew from Dublin. It was approaching Blacksod to refuel when it crashed at Blackrock island, west of Blacksod.

Mr Scott told the inquest that a doctor he had consulted did not object to his decision to take the injured crewman ashore.

He said he used his judgement, accrued over 42 years, and said “in my opinion the man needed off the vessel".

Mr Scott told the inquest he would make the same decision today.

Garda Supt Gary Walsh read a deposition from the captain of the Kings Cross fishing vessel, William Buchan, describing how crewman John James Strachan sustained a severed thumb when he was hauling in nets on the night of March 13th, when the vessel was 140 nautical miles west of Eagle Island.

Mr Buchan recalled hauling at about 9.15 pm on March 13th, 2017 after five or six hours on blue whiting. Mr Strachan’s hand got caught, and Mr Buchan managed to get his hand out of his glove but half of his thumb had been crushed and was inside the glove. He said they put the thumb top in the ship’s freezer.

Cork University emergency registrar Dr Mai Nguyen, who was consulted about the injury on the night of the call-out, told the inquest she felt the decision to task had been made before she was called. She described the injury as “minor”, and said she would not have sent the Irish Cost Guard as there was no hope of re-attaching the severed thumb and they were far from the coast. 

A recording of calls between the Kings Cross vessel, Malin Coast Guard and Dr Nguyen confirmed this at the inquest.

After Dr Nguyen advised skipper, William Buchan on how to handle the casualty, she asked the radio officer if a “medevac” was being carried out and he said it was.

The inquest also heard that in the minutes before the Rescue 116 helicopter was due to land at Blacksod lighthouse helipad to refuel, visibility "dropped fast".

Lightkeeper Vincent Sweeney described how in the minutes before Rescue 116 was due to land to refuel, visibility "dropped fast", to the point that "you'd hardly see your arm in front of you".

The bodies of Captain Dara Fitzpatrick and Captain Mark Duffy were recovered after the crash, but winch operator Paul Ormsby and winchman Ciarán Smith are still missing in spite of extensive searches.

The inquest was formally opened in April 2018 but was adjourned - after a brief sitting and issue of death certificates - to allow for completion of the Air Accident Investigation Unit report and Garda investigations.

The Garda investigation was completed in April 2019 and a file was sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions, but no prosecutions were recommended.

There were 42 recommendations in the 350-page Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) report - 19 applying to the air crew’s employer, CHC Ireland, which holds the Irish Coast Guard contract for four helicopter search and rescue bases.

The AAIU report found the “probable” cause of the crash was a combination of poor weather, the helicopter’s altitude and the crew being unaware of a 282 ft obstacle – as in Blackrock island – on a pre-programmed route guide to Blacksod.

Read the RTÉ News report here

Published in Coastguard
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Over five years after the fatal Rescue 116 helicopter crash off the north Mayo coast, the inquest is due to resume into the deaths of the four Irish Coast Guard air crew.

Dates of June 1st to 3rd have been set by the North Mayo coroner Dr Eleanor Fitzgerald for the inquest which will be held in Belmullet civic centre.

Families of the four crew - Capt Dara Fitzpatrick, Capt Mark Duffy and winch crew Paul Ormsby and Ciarán Smith – are expected to attend or be represented at the three-day hearing.

The crash occurred in the early hours of March 14th, 2017 when the Sikorsky S-92 helicopter collided with Blackrock island, 13 km west of the Mullet peninsula, while approaching Blacksod lighthouse to refuel.

The Dublin-based crew had been asked to provide top cover for the Sligo-based Rescue 118 helicopter which had been tasked for a medical evacuation 141 nautical miles west of Eagle Island. The bodies of the two winch crew have not been found.

It is expected that CHC Ireland, employer of the four air crew, will be represented at the resumed inquest, along with officials from the Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU), the Garda and Irish Coast Guard.

The 350- page final report by AAIU identified "serious and important weaknesses" in management of risk mitigation by CHC Ireland, which holds the Irish Coast Guard search and rescue contract.

It also identified "confusion at State level" regarding responsibility for oversight of search and rescue operations in Ireland.

The AAIU report highlighted how the Irish Aviation Authority believed the Irish Coast Guard to be responsible for search and rescue oversight, when the Irish Coast Guard did not have this expertise.

The coroner’s office confirmed that the recent publication of the AAIU’s final report – delayed by a year due to a request by CHC Ireland for a review - had allowed the inquest to reconvene.

A preliminary inquest was held on April 12th, 2018 to issue death certificates for all four crew, and was then adjourned.

At the preliminary hearing, AAIU chief inspector Jurgen Whyte said that “everything that could be done was done” to find the two missing crew.

He said the search was “very challenging”, and the helicopter could not have come down in a more difficult location.

Speaking on RTÉ Radio 1’s Katie Hannon show last year, Ms Fitzpatrick’s father John said the inquest into the deaths of the crew members would give “finality” and would “mean an awful lot” to the families.

Published in Coastguard
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The "probable cause" of the Rescue 116 Irish Coast Guard helicopter crash, which claimed the lives of four air crew off the north Mayo coast in March 2017, has been identified as a combination of poor weather, the helicopter's altitude and the crew being unaware of a 282ft obstacle on the flight path to an initial waypoint in a pre-programmed route guide.

The 350- page final report by the Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) also identifies "serious and important weaknesses" in management of risk mitigation by helicopter operator, CHC Ireland, which holds the Irish Coast Guard search and rescue (SAR) contract.

Four crew Capt Dara Fitzpatrick, Capt Mark Duffy, winch team Paul Ormsby died in the crash at Blackrock island at 0046.08 hours on March 14th 2017.

The bodies of Capt Fitzpatrick and Capt Duffy were recovered, but both Paul Ormsby and Ciaran Smith are still missing despite extensive searches.

The report recalls how R116 was asked to provide top cover for Rescue 118 from Sligo, which had been tasked to airlift a casualty from a fishing vessel, situated approximately 140 nautical miles off the west coast of Ireland.

Black Rock island Black Rock off the Mullet Peninsula in Co Mayo, where the Sikorsky S-92 helicopter went down Credit: CIL

"At 00.46 hrs, on 14 March 2017, while positioning for an approach to Blacksod from the west, the helicopter, which was flying at 200 feet above the sea, collided with terrain at the western end of Black Rock, departed from controlled flight, and impacted with the sea," it says.

"During the immediate search and rescue response, the Commander was found in the sea to the south-east of Black Rock and was later pronounced dead. Subsequently, the main wreckage of the helicopter was found close to the south-eastern tip of Black Rock, on the seabed at a depth of approximately 40 metres," it says.

Capt Fitzpatrick's colleague Capt Duffy died instantly and was located within the cockpit section of the wreckage and was recovered by Naval service divers.

The report has 42 safety recommendations, which Minister for Transport Eamon Ryan says he accepts

The report has 42 safety recommendations, which Minister for Transport Eamon Ryan says he accepts.

The preliminary report published in April 2017 was critical of lack of navigational information for the crew. It highlighted how personal locator beacons in the pilots' lifejackets malfunctioned due to a conflict in fitting instructions.

The final report, which has been delayed in publication by two years after one of the parties sought a review, identifies "confusion at State level" regarding responsibility for oversight of search and rescue operations in Ireland.

It highlights how the Irish Aviation Authority believed Irish Coast Guard to be responsible for search and rescue oversight, when the Irish Coast Guard did not have this expertise.

Rescue helicopter R116Rescue helicopter R116

The report found that the initial route waypoint for the approach to Blacksod to refuel was almost "coincident" with the terrain at Blackrock island. Flight databases didn't indicate the presence of Blackrock, and neither did some of its imagery. Lighthouses were not clearly marked in the route guide with a small red dot and an elevation in numerical value.

Route guide hazards and obstacles listed on the route guide title page were identified by white numericals, within red circles, outlined in black.

The report has found that the helicopter operator didn't have "formalised, standardised, controlled or periodic" systems of testing flight routes.

Route guides had not been fully proven and updated, there was an error in the length of one of the route legs for Blacksod helipad which had gone undetected since 1999, and emails provided by CHC Ireland showed that one pilot advised in June 2013 that Blackrock lighthouse was not shown on the emergency ground proximity warning system (EGPWS).

It also found that the flight crew members' likely hours of wakefulness at the time of the accident were correlated with "increased error rates and judgement lapses."

A sleep study of some of the operator's SAR crew members found that they accrued less sleep than the US National Sleep Foundation recommended and that "this may not be enough sleep for optimal operational duty".

The Irish Coast Guard four helicopter bases operate a 24-hour shift – the only emergency service to do so –and it is understood that flight duty time was degraded over the years by the Irish Aviation Authority.

The Department of Transport has stated it fully accepts the recommendations contained within the report and will continue to evaluate the findings in the coming weeks.

"This was a tragic accident that claimed the lives of four individuals who were dedicated to saving the lives of others," Minister for Transport Eamon Ryan said.

He said he would "like to again convey my condolences to the families and loved ones of the R116's crew at this time".

"The completion of the Investigation and the publication of the report is a key step in ensuring that such accidents are prevented in the future. I wish to acknowledge the investigative work that has been done by the AAIU that has culminated in this report," he said.

"This is clearly reflected in the level of detail and wide-ranging nature of the report, with safety recommendations that cover all aspects of SAR aviation, both nationally and internationally," he said.

The AAIU, which states its role is not to apportion blame or liability, said it adopted a revised text after a review, and says the final report includes "substantially the same safety recommendations" as those issued in the draft final report in September 2019.

The report notes that the reasons for selecting a 282 ft obstacle as the starting point for what the Operator described as a 'Low Level' route, with no vertical profile, could not be determined because the origins of the route design itself were unknown to the operator.

"a number of factors militated against the flight crew detecting Black Rock"

It identifies a number of factors that militated against the flight crew detecting Black Rock in time to carry out an effective avoidance manoeuvre.

It says Black Rock was not in the emergency ground positioning warning system (EGPWS) databases.

"The BLKMO magenta waypoint symbol and track line likely obscured radar returns from Black Rock (which might have been detected on the 10 NM range)" and the 1:250,000 Aeronautical Chart, Euronav imagery did not extend as far as Black Rock."

"The 1:50,000 Ordnance Survey Ireland imagery in the Toughbook did not show Black Rock, but instead showed open water at Black Rock," it says.

"Furthermore, the operator did not have formal processes or procedures to approve mapping data/imagery for use in its helicopters," it says.

"The operating environment on the west coast would have been more challenging than east coast crews were familiar with, particularly regarding the availability of visual cues in the littoral environment. This meant that it would not have been possible for the Flight crew to accurately assess their horizontal visibility," it says.

"However, given that Black Rock was only detected on the FLIR camera when the Helicopter was approximately 600 m from it, it seems that the horizontal visibility to the naked eye was probably less than 600 m," it says.

"Furthermore, the Flight crew's night vision may have been compromised due to the helicopter's external lighting. Research indicates that if the Flight crew were awake for the length of time suggested by the Investigation's review (18 hours for the Commander and 17 hours for the Co-pilot), they would have been more prone to errors in judgement and decision-making," it says.

"The tempo of the mission was different to east coast missions, and furthermore, the SAR support nature of the mission was known to be monotonous, increasing the risk of the Crew succumbing to fatigue," it says.

"Routes were generally viewed as base-centric, and a level of local knowledge and familiarity may have been assumed, which was an invalid assumption when an east coast crew was utilising a west coast route, a situation compounded by darkness and poor weather," it says.

"The Operator said that the routes were merely there as a framework on which to build a plan for entry/exit to a number of known sites. However, there was no formal training in the use of routes; there was no formal procedure for how a route was to be designed; there was no formal procedure for how a crew should use a route guide; routes did not include a vertical profile or minimum altitudes generally, for route legs; and routes were not available for use in the simulator," it says.

"The Route Guide was prefaced with the statement that it was 'a work in progress and should be used with the necessary caution until all routes/waypoints are proven'. Therefore, the routes were unproven, and the Operator did not have a defined process for route proving. Consequently, in the absence of formal, standardised training, design procedure or procedure for how a crew should use a route guide, it is unclear what beliefs/expectations individual pilots may have had regarding routes and how they could be used operationally," it says.

"Problems with a number of routes had been identified in the SQID system (the Operator's Safety and Quality Integrated Database), however, the SQID report was closed after personnel were emailed to resolve the matter, but without checking that the routes had actually been updated correctly," it says.

"The closing of SQIDS without checking that effective action had been completed was one of a number of issues identified with the Operator's Safety Management System (SMS). The Investigation also found that safety meetings were not being held as often as called for; minutes were not being uploaded onto SQID; SQID closure was not following the protocols set out in the Safety Management and Compliance Monitoring Manual (SMCMM); the quality of Risk Assessments could be improved," it says.

The report recalls how the helicopter maintained a north-westerly track until it reached 200 ft, at which point the Commander announced that Approach One was complete and that she was '[…] just going to help it round the corner … coming to the left'.

"As the Helicopter commenced the left turn back towards BLKMO, the Winchman announced that the Helicopter was 'clear around to the left'. This was followed approximately 30 seconds later by a further announcement from the Co-pilot that they were 'ah clear ahead on E GYP WIZZ and radar'," it says.

"At 00.43 hrs, as the helicopter was turning back towards BLKMO at 200 ft, the 'Before Landing' checklist was commenced. During this time, the Co-pilot stated: 'starting to get ground coming in there at just over eight miles in the ten o'clock position'. Just as the Commander was completing the final item of the 'Before Landing' checklist, she commented that she was visual with the surface of the sea," it says.

"At 00.45 hrs, the Co-pilot announced 'okay so small targets at six miles at 11 o'clock… large out to the right there'. This was followed approximately 20 seconds later by an Auto Callout' Altitude, Altitude', which the Commander said was 'just a small little island that's B L M O itself'," it says.

"Just prior to 00.46 hrs the Winchman announced 'Looking at an island just eh directly ahead of us now guys…you wanna come right [Commander's name]'. The Commander asked for confirmation of the required turn, and the Winchman replied 'twenty degrees right yeh'," it says.

"The Commander instructed the Co-pilot to select heading (HDG) mode, which the Co-pilot acknowledged and actioned. Within one second of this acknowledgement, the Winchman announced 'come right now, come right, COME RIGHT'. Shortly after this, the helicopter pitched up rapidly and rolled to the right. At 00.46:08 hrs, the helicopter collided with terrain at the western end of Black Rock, departed from controlled flight, and impacted with the sea. The main wreckage of the helicopter came to rest on the seabed to the east of Black Rock, at a depth of 40 metres (m)," it says.

In its conclusions, the report states that there were gaps in the way tasking protocols were followed at MRSC Malin.

It says both flight crew members commented adversely about the quality of cockpit lighting, and neither had been to Blackrock recently.

It says the Commander reviewed the route waypoints with the co-pilot and took '*overfly*' off one waypoint, which the Investigation believes was BKSDC (Blacksod).

It says she did not verbalise the obstacle information from APBSS route into Blacksod, when she briefed the route but it appears that she did read at least some of the information because she was aware of an obstacle to the west of Blacksod when the Co-pilot asked about an escape heading.

It says the co-pilot self-briefed the route and he did not verbalise the obstacle information.

"Radar was operated on the 10 NM range throughout the descent and manoeuvring to commence APBSS," it says.

It says Black Rock was not identified on radar which was likely due to obscuration caused by the magenta BLKMO waypoint marker and the magenta track line to the waypoint marker.

"Black Rock was not in the EGPWS databases. The 1:250,000 Aeronautical Chart, Euronav imagery did not extend as far as Black Rock. The 1:50,000 OSI imagery available on the Toughbook did not show Black Rock Lighthouse or terrain, and appeared to show open water in the vicinity of Black Rock," it says.

"The AIS transponder installed on the helicopter was capable of receiving AIS Aids-to Navigation transmissions; however, the AIS add-on application for the Toughbook mapping software could not display AIS Aids-to-Navigation transmissions," it says.

"The winchman announced that he had detected an island ahead on the EO/IR camera system when the helicopter was about 0.3 NM from it, travelling at a ground speed of 90 kts. The winchman called for a change of heading and the flight crew were in the process of making the change when the urgency of the situation became clear to the winchman," it says.

"There is no indication on the cockpit voice recorder that the flight crew saw Black Rock, although in the final seconds of flight there was a significant, manual input on the Collective Lever, an associated 'droop' in main rotor RPM and a roll to the right," it says.

"the Department of Transport lacked the technical expertise to oversee the IAA"

"The helicopter collided with terrain at the western end of Black Rock, departed from controlled flight and impacted with the sea. At no stage did any member of the crew comment on seeing, or expecting to see, a light from Black Rock Lighthouse," it says.

It says the Department of Transport lacked the technical expertise to oversee the IAA and the Irish Coast Guard did not have a safety management system.

"Numerous areas, across several agencies, are explored in-depth in the Final Report, it says which demonstrate that the accident was, in effect, what expert Professor James Reason termed 'an organisational accident'," it says.

"The Final Report highlights the importance of robust processes in relation to the following areas: Route Guide design, waypoint positioning, and associated training; reporting and correcting of anomalies in EGPWS and charting systems; Fatigue Risk Management Systems; Toughbook usage; en route low altitude operation; and the functionality of emergency equipment," it says

"It is particularly important that an operator involved in Search and Rescue has an effective Safety Management System, which has the potential to improve flight safety by reacting appropriately to safety issues reported, and by proactively reducing risk with the aid of a rigorous risk assessment process, "it says.

The Final Report identifies the importance of the levels of expertise within organisations involved in contracting and tasking complex operations such as Search and Rescue, to ensure that associated risks are understood, that effective oversight of contracted services can be maintained and that helicopters only launch when absolutely necessary.

In a statement, Hermione Duffy, wife of the late Capt Mark Duffy, said her husband had been an excellent pilot and father and, together with his colleagues, shared a deep commitment to his search and rescue role, always taking pride and satisfaction from his work.

Ms Duffy asked people to remember that "four honourable souls lost their precious lives that night in the service of others, and in circumstances which are harrowing and traumatic to read of and which have left wives, children, parents and extended families bereft".

"the loss of four aircrew lives was "as needless as it was preventable"

The Irish Airline Pilots Association (IALPA) said the report shows that the loss of four aircrew lives was "as needless as it was preventable", it says.

The final publication of the Report corresponds with the AAIU Interim and Preliminary reports and "makes it clear that the crew of R116 were exemplary in the performance of their assigned task", IALPA says.

"Their planning, response, teamwork, and communication was exactly what would be expected from such a competent and seasoned crew, on a flight led by such professional pilots," it says.

"They were let down by a regulatory system which left them ill-equipped to do the vital work that same system tasked them with," it says.

"The report outlines a number of regulatory and systemic issues which conspired to put the crew in lethal danger. Prime amongst them was the provision of inaccurate and misleading chart and map data," IALPA says.

"All flight crew rely on the basic assumption that their maps and charts provide accurate data. Few flight crews could be more reliant on that assumption of accurate data than the crew of a rescue helicopter, operating offshore in challenging conditions outside their normal home base, scrambled at short notice to launch a rescue in the middle of the night (00:45 am). They relied on the data production standards of Irish regulation to guarantee them correct information" it says.

"They were let down," IALPA says.

IALPA President Evan Cullen described it as a fundamental betrayal, and said that "as an airline pilot, if I take a flight from Dublin to Rome, I must navigate the Alps, and I expect one of two things from the Swiss authorities; tell me the height of the alps, or tell me they don't know the heights, so I'd better avoid them. The one thing they can't do, under any circumstances, ever, is tell me the wrong height, or tell me the Alps are not there," he said.

"In essence that is what the Irish State did to Dara, Mark, Paul and Ciarán. They approved information which said, 'you are safe', when the absolute opposite was the truth."

IALPA said the report details failures in oversight, equipment requirements and maintenance, and in resourcing for SAR.

"But it is the regulatory failure by the now-defunct Irish Aviation Authority which is central to this accident. They set the standards for equipment, for mapping, and for oversight. They accepted standards which most, if not all, of their European peer authorities, would not," IALPA says.

"This tragic and unnecessary loss of life must not be allowed to happen again. IALPA is calling on the Government and Minister for Transport to institute an immediate review of the failures identified in this report, and to bring forward concrete proposals to address each and every identified failure immediately," it says.

CHC Ireland responds

CHC Ireland said it would like to express its deepest sympathy towards the family and friends of our colleagues; Ciarán, Dara, Mark and Paul", and welcomed the final report.

The company said it acknowledged the work of the AAIU "in producing such a comprehensive review", which is "extremely thorough and will make difficult reading for all those involved".

"These lessons will undoubtedly be applied across Search and Rescue operations in Ireland and throughout the world. We are also grateful for the work of the Chair of the Review Board," CHC Ireland said.

"CHC Ireland continues to advance aviation safety by investing in ongoing employee training and development, working to global standards and engaging with aviation stakeholders. Our commitment is to deliver essential Search and Rescue services to the people of Ireland in a safe and professional manner," it said.

"We are committed to implementing the appropriate Safety Recommendations that are directed towards CHC Ireland in the Final Report. The report is clear that the organisation of Search and Rescue in Ireland involves many stakeholders including the Irish Aviation Authority, the Irish Coast Guard and the European Aviation Safety Agency. CHC Ireland will ensure that it collaborates with all the relevant stakeholders to address the recommendations. The most important thing is that we collectively ensure that all areas identified for further strengthening are actioned," it said.

"We continue to honour the memories of Ciarán, Dara, Mark and Paul. They will never be forgotten"

CHC Ireland general operations manager Rob Tatten referred to the "unwavering commitment" of all those involved in search and rescue.

"Our crews continue to fly hundreds of search and rescue missions every year, saving many lives. Our team is justifiably proud of our global safety record and everyone in CHC Ireland is committed to the safe delivery of our service," he said.

"We continue to honour the memories of Ciarán, Dara, Mark and Paul. They will never be forgotten," Mr Tatten said.

Irish Aviation Authority statement

The Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) issued a statement this evening saying it wished to "take the opportunity to again express our greatest sympathy to the families and friends of the four crew members of the Irish Coast Guard R116, who tragically lost their lives while undertaking a rescue mission on 14 March 2017"

The authority said it welcomed the publication today of the Air Accident Investigation UUnit's (AAIU) comprehensive report into this accident, which we believe will contribute to the prevention of future aviation accidents both in Ireland and indeed globally.

We have reviewed and fully accept the recommendations addressed to the IAA, which have already been implemented or are proceeding to full implementation. We will verify our progress in this regard to the AAIU.

At the time of the R116 accident, the IAA exercised safety oversight of the operator through their Air Operator Certificate and a national Search & Rescue approval. As indicated in the AAIU report, Search & Rescue regulation is not covered by ICAO or EU safety rules. The AAIU has recommended that the EU Commission review Search & Rescue safety standards at European level with a view to developing guidance material, and the IAA supports this recommendation. The IAA continues to work on an on-going basis with the European Commission and EASA in the development of safety rules.

As the aviation regulator for Ireland, the safety of air crew and passengers is our number one priority. We want to restate our commitment to working with all stakeholders to achieve this aim, including the implementation of all safety recommendations in the AAIU report.

The IAA is currently undergoing a programme of institutional restructuring, which will establish a new, single, independent aviation regulator for civil aviation in Ireland. This conforms with best practice for institutional structure and governance for regulators in Europe and globally.

Pilot Dara FitzpatrickPilot Dara Fitzpatrick

In a statement the family of pilot Dara Fitzpatrick said they believed that Dara and her fellow crew members were ""adly let down" "by operator CHC Ireland for ""ot providing them with the safe operating procedures and training that they were entitled to expect'"

Family response

The Fitzpatrick family said there was an expectation on the operator of the search and rescue service to minimise the risk to the crew by aiming to remove risk and providing crews with safety procedures on which they can rely.

"Unfortunately, this was not done on this occasion," "the Fitzpatrick family said.

"We hope that the AAIU final report and the review board report will ensure that those responsible for this operation, both directly and at a supervisory level, urgently implement the necessary changes, and that in future they pay attention to the feedback that they get from flight crew as to any inadequacies and hazards in the operation, so that such an accident will never happen again, that no one else will needlessly lose their lives, and that no other families will have to endure the devastating loss that we endure with the untimely death of our beautiful Dara," "the family stated.

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Minister for Transport Eamon Ryan has said his department will cover “reasonable legal expenses” incurred by the families of the four Rescue 116 air crew who died off North Mayo in relation to a review of the draft final Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) report.

In a statement issued this Thursday evening, Mr Ryan said he had written to the families of the crew of R116 that afternoon.

He said he had “ let them know that the Department of Transport will cover their reasonable legal expenses incurred as a result of the Review into the accident in which their loved ones lost their lives”.

Pilots Dara Fitzpatrick and Mark Duffy and winch team Paul Ormsby and Ciarán Smith died when their Sikorsky S-92 crashed at Blackrock island off north Mayo in the early hours of March 14th, 2017.

The four crew were employed by CHC Ireland which holds the Irish Coast Guard search and rescue contract.

The AAIU issued a preliminary and interim reports, and sent its draft final report to “interested parties” in September 2019 with a 60-day window for submissions and comments.

However, in March 2020, former transport minister permitted the establishment of a review board to examine certain findings in the draft final report before publication, following a request from one of the parties.

A review board, chaired by senior counsel Patrick McCann, was established under Regulation 16 of Air Navigation Regulations 2009.

The Irish Airline Pilots Association and European Cockpit Association were critical of this decision as being against the international norm, which seeks to ensure investigations are published within a timeframe to improve safety.

The AAIU does not apportion blame, and this was the first time its draft final report had been subject to such a review.

Earlier this week, RTÉ Investigates reported that three of the four families were obliged to pay for their own legal representation in the review which had been sought by the air crews’ employer, CHC Ireland, and had incurred substantial costs.

Ryan said that “the chairman of the Review board wrote to me with a recommendation that the reasonable legal costs of the families be covered”.

“I was happy to accept this recommendation and asked my officials to work on a mechanism to resolve the issue,” he said.

“The families of the crew did not ask for the review and were placed in a position of having to contribute to a complex process to ensure their loved ones’ interests were fully represented,”Ryan said.

“While the Department of Transport argued before the review board that it did not have authority to make an order on costs, this was done because of the broader implications that such a ruling might have in future,” he said.

“ This was never intended to imply a reluctance to pay these costs, and the additional stress this may have caused is regretted,” he said.

“In writing to the families, I am also conscious that they will shortly receive the final report of the investigation into the accident, a moment which is bound to be difficult for all concerned,” he said.

“Today we remember the service of pilot Dara Fitzpatrick, co-pilot Mark Duffy, winchman Ciarn Smith and winch operator Paul Ormsby who gave their lives in the courageous pursuit of protecting others,” Ryan said.

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Skerries RNLI’s volunteers launched their inshore lifeboat on Wednesday evening (21 April) as part of a multi-agency response to reports of a swimmer in difficulty near the Martello tower in Balbriggan.

The Atlantic 85 lifeboat Louis Simson was launched within minutes of the crew being paged just before 7pm and proceeded directly to the area indicated.

On arrival the crew found the Dublin-based Irish Coast Guard helicopter Rescue 116 already on scene and winching a man from the water.

The casualty was the lowered onto the beach and into the care of an ambulance crew and members of Dublin Fire Brigade who administered first aid before he was transferred to hospital.

Meanwhile, further reports came in that other swimmers had entered the water to assist the casualty and a subsequent emergency call raised concerns that there may still be someone in the water.

Rescue 116, Skerries RNLI and the Skerries Coast Guard unit coordinated to carry out a search of the immediate area covering the water and the shoreline.

The lifeboat investigated a number of objects at the request of Rescue 116, including a lifebuoy which they recovered into the lifeboat.

When Dublin Coast Guard was satisfied that the area had been thoroughly searched and there were no further swimmers in danger, the lifeboat was stood down and returned to station.

Speaking about the callout, press officer Gerry Canning said: “When a person is in trouble in the water, every second counts. Rescue 116 were on scene very quickly and it was an excellent response from all of the emergency services who worked brilliantly together.

“Our thoughts are with the friends and family of the man taken from the water and we hope he makes a full recovery.”

Published in RNLI Lifeboats

A European pilots’ organisation has expressed alarm at the delay in publishing the final report into the loss of four air crew in the Rescue 116 helicopter crash off the Mayo coast four years ago.

As The Times Ireland edition reports, European Cockpit Association (ECA) president Captain Otjan de Bruijn has also questioned why Ireland had adopted a “rare procedure” where an aviation accident investigation can be re-examined before publication.

An air accident investigation must be published to ensure key safety lessons can be learned “swiftly”, Capt de Bruijn said, and he has urged release of the report “without delay”.

Capt Dara Fitzpatrick, Capt Mark Duffy and winch team Paul Ormsby and Ciarán Smith died after their Irish Coast Guard Sikorsky S-92 helicopter crashed at Blackrock island off the north Mayo coast on March 14th, 2017.

The four Dublin-based helicopter crew were providing “top cover” communication for the medical evacuation of a crewman from a British-registered fishing vessel off the west coast.

The Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) issued a preliminary report and a series of interim reports, and a final draft report was given to families and stakeholders in late 2019, with a 60-day period for submissions.

However, its publication was put on hold by a request in January 2020 by an unidentified stakeholder for a review, which was granted by Ryan’s predecessor, Shane Ross.

The ECA president said that the final report was due in January 2020, and it “is an extremely long delay for publishing a report”

Capt de Bruijn said that during these four years, “possible safety-critical flaws have remained unaddressed – something we are quite alarmed about”.

“Any deficiencies that have been identified in the accident investigation must be made public, out in the open so they can be fixed swiftly. In the interests of passenger safety, we urge the Irish AAIU to release the report without delay,” he said.

“We are not aware of any other similar cases across Europe of a re-examination of the technical work of an independent technically qualified organisation by a body with limited expertise in aviation accident investigations,” Capt de Bruijn said of the review board option.

“This rare procedure could be a slippery slope allowing for undue influence over the investigation process and its findings, and clearly has resulted in an unhelpful delay in the publication of the report,” he said.

“Let us not forget that the final report contains safety-critical recommendations that are valuable – and potentially life-saving – lessons for the aviation system in and beyond Ireland,” he said.

The Irish Airline Pilots Association (IALPA) has already questioned the decision to include a review in the Irish legislation, and said the review “does not comply with the standards and recommended practices laid down by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)”.

The Department of Transport said, “the review board is independent in its work in accordance with the 2009 Regulations and the timeframe for the board to carry out the re-examination is a matter for the chairperson to determine”.

Read more in The Times here

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Minister for Transport Eamon Ryan has appointed a new review board into the Air Accident Investigation Unit’s (AAIU) final report on the Rescue 116 helicopter crash.

As The Irish Independent reports today, the review experienced a setback last month when the technical advisor Philip Hanson, an aviation expert with the British Maritime and Coastguard Agency, stood down over a potential conflict of interest.

However, Mr Ryan has established a new board to review aspects of the unpublished AAIU final report into the crash, which claimed the lives of Capt Dara Fitzpatrick, Capt Mark Duffy and winch team Paul Ormsby and Ciarán Smith off the north Mayo coast in March 2017.

The minister has opted to re-appoint senior counsel Patrick McCann as chairman and sole member of the review, following legal advice from the Attorney-General.

Mr McCann was chair of the previous review which was established by former transport minister Shane Ross earlier this year, and Mr Hanson was appointed as technical expert.

In a parliamentary response to Galway West Independent TD Catherine Connolly, the transport minister says the new timeframe for the re-examination of the final report is “ a matter for the chairperson to determine” as the board is “entirely independent in its work”.

Relatives of the four air crew are now waiting over three-and-a-half years for the final report into the Sikorsky S-92 collision, which occurred at Blackrock island, Co Mayo, while the helicopter was approaching Blacksod lighthouse to refuel.

The four Dublin-based crew were providing “top” cover” or support to a medical evacuation off the west coast by the Sligo-based Rescue 118 helicopter.

The bodies of the two winch crew have not been found in spite of extensive searches.

A draft of the final report was given last November to the families of the four crew and stakeholders including their employer, CHC Ireland, with a 60-day period for submissions or comments.

However, its publication had to be put on hold when Mr Ross acceded to a request for a “notice of re-examination” by an unidentified stakeholder.

Under Ireland’s Air Navigation (Notification and Investigation of Accidents, Serious Incidents and Incidents) Regulations 2009, a review can be applied for by an “interested party” in relation to “findings and conclusions that appear to reflect adversely on the person’s reputation”.

A Department of Transport spokeswoman said the minister was notified of Mr Hanson’s alleged conflict of interest on September 22nd. She said Mr Hanson did not receive any payment for his work on the review board over the past six months.

CHC Ireland has declined to say whether it sought the review. It was the first request of its type in the AAIU’s history of undertaking air crash investigations.

The AAIU had ruled out mechanical fault early on, and made recommendations in a preliminary report published a month after the helicopter crash, relating to anomalies in chart information software and a flaw in installation of locator beacons on crew life-jackets.

In its first interim report, the AAIU highlighted failures of oversight for search and rescue by the State.

It also recommended a review of safety management systems by CHC Ireland; and it identified a software issue with data recorded, which was not directly relevant to the cause of the crash.

It recommended a thorough review of search and rescue aviation operations in Ireland, which former minister Mr Ross commissioned.

Read more here

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General Information on using Waterways Ireland inland navigations

Safety on the Water

All users of the navigations are strongly recommended to make themselves aware of safety on the water for whatever activity they are involved in and to read the advice offered by the various governing bodies and by:

The Dept. of Transport, Ireland: www.gov.ie/transport and The Maritime and Coastguard Agency, UK, The RNLI – Water Safety Ireland for information in terms of drowning prevention and water safety.

Registration of Vessels

All vessels using the Shannon Navigation, which includes the Shannon-Erne Waterways and the Erne System must be registered with Waterways Ireland. Only open undecked boats with an engine of 15 horsepower or less on the Shannon Navigation, and vessels of 10 horsepower or less on the Erne System, are exempt. Registration is free of charge.

Craft registration should be completed online at: https://www.waterwaysireland.org/online-services/craft-registration

Permits for use of the Grand and Royal Canals and the Barrow Navigation

All vessels using the Grand and Royal Canals and the Barrow Navigation must display appropriate valid Permit(s) i.e A Combined Mooring and Passage Permit (€126) and if not intending to move every five days, an Extended Mooring Permit (€152).

Permit applications should be completed online at: https://www.waterwaysireland.org/online-services/canal-permits

Passage on the Royal and Grand Canals – Dublin Area

For boat passage through the locks east of Lock 12 into / out of Dublin on either the Royal or Grand Canals, Masters are requested to contact the Waterways Ireland Eastern Regional Office (M-F 9.30am-4.30pm) on tel: +353(0)1 868 0148 or email [email protected] prior to making passage in order to plan the necessary lock-keeping assistance arrangements.

On the Grand Canal a minimum of two days notice prior to the planned passage should be given, masters should note that with the exception of pre-arranged events, a maximum of 2 boats per day will be taken through the locks, travelling either east or west.

Movements in or out of the city will be organised by prior arrangement to take place as a single movement in one day. Boaters will be facilitated to travel the system if their passage is considered to be safe by Waterways Ireland and they have the valid permit(s) for mooring and passage.

Newcomen Lifting Bridge

On the Royal Canal two weeks’ notice of bridge passage (Newcomen Lifting Bridge) is required for the pre-set lift date, and lock assistance will then also be arranged. A minimum of 2 boats is required for a bridge lift to go ahead.

Waterways Ireland Eastern Regional Office (Tel: +353(0)1 868 0148 or [email protected] ) is the point of contact for the bridge lift.

A maximum number of boats passing will be implemented to keep to the times given above for the planned lifts (16 for the Sat / Sun lifts & 8 for the weekday lifts). Priority will be given on a first come first served basis.

On day of lift, boaters and passengers must follow guidance from Waterways Ireland staff about sequence of passage under bridge & through Lock 1, and must remain within signed and designated areas.

Events Held on the Waterways

All organised events taking place on the waterways must have the prior approval of Waterways Ireland. This is a twelve week process and application forms must be accompanied with the appropriate insurance, signed indemnity and risk assessment. The application should be completed on the Waterways Ireland events page at :

https://www.waterwaysireland.org/online-services/event-approval

Time Limits on Mooring in Public Harbours

On the Shannon Navigation and the Shannon-Erne Waterway craft may berth in public harbours for five consecutive days or a total of seven days in any one month.

On the Erne System, revised Bye Laws state that: No master or owner shall permit a vessel, boat or any floating or sunken object to remain moored at or in the vicinity of any public mooring, including mooring at any other public mooring within 3 kilometres of that location, for more than 3 consecutive days and shall not moor at that same mooring or any other public mooring within 3 kilometres of that location within the following 3 consecutive days without prior permission by an authorised official.

Winter Mooring on the Shannon Navigation and Shannon Erne Waterway

Winter mooring may be availed of by owners during the period 1 Nov to 31 Mar by prior arrangement and payment of a charge of €63.50 per craft. Craft not availing of Winter Mooring must continue to comply with the “5 Day Rule”. Winter Mooring applications should be completed online at : https://www.waterwaysireland.org/online-services/winter-moorings-booking

Owners should be aware that electricity supply and water supply to public moorings is disconnected for the winter months. This is to protect against frost damage, to reduce running costs and to minimise maintenance requirements during the winter months.

Vessel owners are advised that advance purchasing of electricity on the power bollards leading up to the disconnection date should be minimal. Electricity credit existing on the bollards will not be recoverable after the winter decommissioning date. Both services will be reinstated prior to the commencement of the next boating season.

Smart Cards

Waterways Ireland smart cards are used to operate locks on the Shannon Erne Waterway, to access the service blocks, to use the pump-outs along the navigations, to avail of electrical power at Waterways Ireland jetties.

Berthing in Public Harbours

Masters are reminded of the following:

  • Equip their vessel with mooring lines of appropriate length and strength and only secure their craft to mooring bollards and cleats provided for this purpose.
  • Ensure the available berth is suitable to the length of your vessel, do not overhang the mooring especially on finger moorings on floating pontoon moorings.
  • Ensure mooring lines, electric cables and fresh water hoses do not create a trip hazard on public jetties for others users.
  • Carry sufficient fenders to prevent damage to your own vessel, other vessels and WI property.
  • Allow sufficient space between your vessel and the vessel ahead /astern (c.1m) for fire safety purposes and /or to recover somebody from the water.
  • Do not berth more than two vessels side by side and ensure there is safe access/egress at all times between vessels and onto the harbour itself.
  • Do not berth in such a way to prevent use of harbour safety ladders, slipways or pump-outs.
  • Do not allow the bow of your vessel to overhang the walkway of a floating mooring thus creating a hazard for others with an overhanging anchor or bow fendering.
  • Animals are not allowed to be loose or stray at any time.
  • Harbour and jetty infrastructure such as railings, power pedestals, fresh water taps, electric light poles, safety bollards, ladders etc are not designed for the purpose of mooring craft , they will not bear the strain of a vessel and will be damaged.
  • At Carrybridge on the Erne System, Masters of vessels are not permitted to use stern on mooring. Masters of vessels must use the mooring fingers for mooring of vessels and for embarkation / disembarkation from vessels.

Passenger Vessel Berths

Masters of vessels should not berth on passenger vessel berths where it is indicated that an arrival is imminent. Passenger vessels plying the navigations generally only occupy the berths to embark and disembark passengers and rarely remain on the berths for extended periods or overnight.

Lock Lead-in Jetties

Lead-in jetties adjacent to the upstream and downstream gates at lock chambers are solely for the purpose of craft waiting to use the lock and should not be used for long term berthing.

Vessel Wake

Vessel wake, that is, the wave generated by the passage of the boat through the water, can sometimes be large, powerful and destructive depending on the hull shape and engine power of the vessel. This wake can be detrimental to other users of the navigation when it strikes their craft or inundates the shoreline or riverbank. Masters are requested to frequently look behind and check the effect of their wake / wash particularly when passing moored vessels, on entering harbours and approaching jetties and to be aware of people pursuing other activities such as fishing on the riverbank.

Speed Restriction

A vessel or boat shall not be navigated on the Shannon Navigation at a speed in excess of 5 kph when within 200 metres of a bridge, quay, jetty or wharf, when in a harbour or canal or when passing within 100 metres of a moored vessel or boat.

Vessels navigating the Shannon-Erne Waterway should observe the general 5 kph speed limit which applies along the waterway. This is necessary in order to prevent damage to the banks caused by excessive wash from vessels.

Vessels navigating the Erne System should observe the statutory 5kt / 6mph / 10kph speed limit areas.

A craft on the Royal and Grand canals shall not be navigated at a speed in excess of 6km per hour.

A craft on the Barrow Navigation shall not be navigated at a speed in excess of 11km per hour except as necessary for safe navigation in conditions of fast flow.

Bank Erosion

Narrow sections of all the navigations are particularly prone to bank erosion due to the large wash generated by some craft. Masters are requested to be vigilant and to slow down to a speed sufficient to maintain steerage when they observe the wash of their craft inundating the river banks.

Unusual Waterborne Activity

Unusual waterborne vessels may be encountered from time to time, such as, hovercraft or amphibious aircraft / seaplanes. Masters of such craft are reminded to apply the normal “Rule of the Road” when they meet conventional craft on the water and to allow extra room to manoeuvre in the interest of safety.

Sailing Activity

Mariners will encounter large numbers of sailing dinghies from late June to August in the vicinity of Lough Derg, Lough Ree and Lower Lough Erne. Sailing courses are marked by yellow buoys to suit weather conditions on the day. Vessels should proceed at slow speed and with due caution and observe the rules of navigation when passing these fleets, as many of the participants are junior sailors under training.

Rowing

Mariners should expect to meet canoes and vessels under oars on any part of the navigations, but more so in the vicinity of Athlone, Carrick-on-Shannon, Coleraine, Enniskillen and Limerick. Masters are reminded to proceed at slow speed and especially to reduce their wash to a minimum when passing these craft as they can be easily upset and swamped due to their very low freeboard and always be prepared to give way in any given traffic situation.

Canoeing

Canoeing is an adventure sport and participants are strongly recommended to seek the advice of the sport’s governing bodies i.e Canoeing Ireland and the Canoe Association of Northern Ireland, before venturing onto the navigations.

Persons in charge of canoes are reminded of the inherent danger to these craft associated with operating close to weirs, sluice gates, locks and other infrastructure particularly when rivers are in flood and large volumes of water are moving through the navigations due to general flood conditions or very heavy localised precipitation e.g. turbulent and broken water, stopper waves. Shooting weirs is prohibited without prior permission of Waterways Ireland.

Canoeists should check with lockkeepers prior entering a lock to ensure passage is done in a safe manner. Portage is required at all unmanned locks.

Canoe Trail Network – "Blueways"

Masters of powered craft are reminded that a canoe trail network is being developed across all navigations and to expect more organised canoeing along these trails necessitating slow speed and minimum wash when encountering canoeists, rowing boats etc

Rockingham and Drummans Island Canals – Lough Key

It is expected that work on Rockingham and Drummans Island Canals on Lough Key will be completed in 2021. Access to these canals will be for non-powered craft only, eg canoes, kayaks, rowing boats.

Fast Powerboats and Personal Watercraft (Jet Skis)

Masters of Fast Powerboats (speed greater than 17kts) and Personal Watercraft (i.e.Jet Skis) are reminded of the inherent dangers associated with high speed on the water and especially in the confines of small bays and narrow sections of the navigations. Keeping a proper look-out, making early alterations to course and /or reducing speed will avoid conflict with slower vessels using the navigation. Personal Watercraft are not permitted to be used on the canals.

Towing Waterskiers, Wakeboarders, Doughnuts etc

Masters of vessels engaged in any of these activities are reminded of the manoeuvring constraints imposed upon their vessel by the tow and of the added responsibilities that they have to the person(s) being towed. These activities should be conducted in areas which are clear of conflicting traffic. It is highly recommended that a person additional to the master be carried to act as a “look-out” to keep the tow under observation at all times.

Prohibition on Swimming

Swimming in the navigable channel, particularly at bridges, is dangerous and is prohibited due to the risk of being run over by a vessel underway in the navigation.

Age Restrictions on operating of powered craft

In the Republic of Ireland, Statutory Instrument 921 of 2005 provides the legal requirements regarding the minimum age for operating of powered craft. The Statutory Instrument contains the following requirements:

- The master or owner of a personal watercraft or a fast power craft shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that a person who has not attained the age of 16 years does not operate or control the craft

- The master or owner of a pleasure craft powered by an engine with a rating of more than 5 horse power or 3.7 kilowatts shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that a person who has not attained the age of 12 years does not operate or control the craft.

Lifejackets and Personal Flotation Devices (PFDs)

Lifejackets and PFD’s are the single most important items of personal protective equipment to be used on a vessel and should be worn especially when the vessel is being manoeuvred such as entering / departing a lock, anchoring, coming alongside or departing a jetty or quayside.

In the Republic of Ireland, Statutory Instrument 921 of 2005 provides the legal requirements regarding the wearing of Personal Flotation Devices. The Statutory Instrument contains the following requirements:

- The master or owner of a pleasure craft (other than a personal watercraft) shall ensure, that there are, at all times on board the craft, sufficient suitable personal flotation devices for each person on board.

- A person on a pleasure craft (other than a personal watercraft) of less than 7 metres length overall shall wear a suitable personal flotation device while on board an open craft or while on the deck of decked craft, other than when the craft is made fast to the shore or at anchor.

- The master or owner of a pleasure craft (other than a personal watercraft) shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that a person who has not attained the age of 16 years complies with paragraph above.

- The master or owner of a pleasure craft (other than a personal watercraft), shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that a person who has not attained the age of 16 years wears a suitable personal flotation device while on board an open craft or while on the deck of a decked craft other than when it is made fast to the shore or at anchor.

- The master or owner of a pleasure craft (other than a personal watercraft) shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that a person wears a suitable personal flotation device, at all times while – (a) being towed by the craft, (b) on board a vessel or object of any kind which is being towed by the craft.

Further information is available at: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2005/si/921/made/en/print

Firing Range Danger Area – Lough Ree

The attention of mariners is drawn to the Irish Defence Forces Firing Range situated in the vicinity of buoys No’s 2 and 3, on Lough Ree on the Shannon Navigation. This range is used regularly for live firing exercises, throughout the year, all boats and vessels should stay clear of the area marked with yellow buoys showing a yellow "X" topmark and displaying the word "Danger".

Shannon Navigation, Portumna Swing Bridge Tolls

No attempt should be made by Masters’ of vessels to pay the bridge toll while making way through the bridge opening. Payment will only be taken by the Collector from Masters when they are secured alongside the jetties north and south of the bridge.

Navigating from Killaloe to Limerick on the Shannon Navigation

The navigation from Killaloe to Limerick involves passage through Ardnacrusha locks, the associated headrace and tailrace and the Abbey River into Limerick City. Careful passage planning is required to undertake this voyage. Considerations include: lock passage at Ardnacrusha, water flow in the navigation, airdraft under bridges on Abbey River in Limerick, state of tide in Limerick

Users are advised to contact the ESB Ardnacrusha hydroelectric power station (00353 (0)87 9970131) 48 hours in advance of commencing their journey to book passage through the locks at Ardnacrusha. It is NOT advised to undertake a voyage if more than one turbine is operating (20MW), due to the increased velocity of flow in the navigation channel, which can be dangerous. To ascertain automatically in real time how many turbines are running, users can phone +353 (0)87 6477229.

For safety reasons the ESB has advised that only powered craft with a capacity in excess of 5 knots are allowed to enter Ardnacrusha Headrace and Tailrace Canals.

Passage through Sarsfield Lock should be booked on +353-87-7972998, on the day prior to travel and it should be noted also that transit is not possible two hours either side of low water.

A Hydrographic survey in 2020 of the navigation channel revealed that the approach from Shannon Bridge to Sarsfield Lock and the Dock area has silted up. Masters of vessels and water users are advised to navigate to the Lock from Shannon bridge on a rising tide one or two hours before High Tide.

Lower Bann Navigation

The attention of all users is drawn to the “Users Code for the Lower Bann”, in particular to that section covering “Flow in the River” outlining the dangers for users both on the banks and in the navigation, associated with high flow rates when the river is in spate. Canoeists should consult and carry a copy of the “Lower Bann Canoe Trail” guide issued by the Canoe Association of Northern Ireland. Users should also contact the DfI Rivers Coleraine, who is responsible for regulating the flow rates on the river, for advisory information on the flow rates to be expected on any given day.

DfI Rivers Coleraine. Tel: 0044 28 7034 2357 Email: [email protected]

Lower Bann Navigation – Newferry – No wake zone

A No Wake Zone exists on the Lower Bann Navigation at Newferry. Masters of vessels are requested to proceed at a slow speed and create no wake while passing the jetties and slipways at Newferry.

Overhead Power Lines (OHPL) and Air draft

All Masters must be aware of the dangers associated with overhead power lines, in particular sailing vessels and workboats with cranes or large air drafts. Voyage planning is a necessity in order to identify the location of overhead lines crossing the navigation.

Overhead power line heights on the River Shannon are maintained at 12.6metres (40 feet) from Normal Summer level for that section of navigation, masters of vessels with a large air draft should proceed with caution and make additional allowances when water levels are high.

If a vessel or its equipment comes into contact with an OHPL the operator should NOT attempt to move the vessel or equipment. The conductor may still be alive or re-energise automatically. Maintain a safe distance and prevent third parties from approaching due to risk of arcing. Contact the emergency services for assistance.

Anglers are also reminded that a minimum ground distance of 30 metres should be maintained from overhead power lines when using a rod and line.

Submarine Cables and Pipes

Masters of vessels are reminded not to anchor their vessels in the vicinity of submarine cables or pipes in case they foul their anchor or damage the cables or pipes. Look to the river banks for signage indicating their presence.

Water Levels - Precautions

Low Water Levels:

When water levels fall below normal summer levels masters should be aware of:

Navigation

To reduce the risk of grounding masters should navigate on or near the centreline of the channel, avoid short cutting in dog-legged channels and navigating too close to navigation markers.

Proceeding at a slow speed will also reduce “squat” effect i.e. where the vessel tends to sit lower in the water as a consequence of higher speed.

Slipways

Reduced slipway length available under the water surface and the possibility of launching trailers dropping off the end of the concrete apron.

More slipway surface susceptible to weed growth requiring care while engaged in launching boats, from slipping and sliding on the slope. Note also that launching vehicles may not be able to get sufficient traction on the slipway once the craft is launched to get up the incline.

Bank Erosion

Very dry riverbanks are more susceptible to erosion from vessel wash.

Lock Share

Maximising on the number of vessels in a lock will ensure that the total volume of water moving downstream is decreased. Lock cycles should be used for vessels travelling each way.

High Water Levels:

When water levels rise above normal summer level masters should be aware of:

Navigation

Navigation marks will have reduced height above the water level or may disappear underwater altogether making the navigable channel difficult to discern.

In narrow sections of the navigations water levels will tend to rise more quickly than in main streams and air draft at bridges will likewise be reduced.

There will also be increased flow rates particularly in the vicinity of navigation infrastructure such as bridges, weirs, locks etc where extra care in manoeuvring vessels will be required.

Harbours and Jetties

Due care is required in harbours and at slipways when levels are at or near the same level as the harbour walkways' as the edge will be difficult to discern especially in reduced light conditions. It is advised that Personal Flotation Devices be worn if tending to craft in a harbour in these conditions.

Slipways

Slipways should only be used for the purpose of launching and recovering of water craft or other objects from the water. Before using a slipway it should be examined to ensure that the surface has sufficient traction/grip for the intended purpose such as launching a craft from a trailer using a vehicle, that there is sufficient depth of water on the slipway to float the craft off the trailer before the concrete apron ends and that the wheels of the trailer do not drop off the edge of the slipway. That life-saving appliances are available in the vicinity, that the vehicle is roadworthy and capable of coping with the weight of the trailer and boat on the incline. It is recommended that slipway operations are conducted by two persons.

Caution to be Used in Reliance upon Aids to Navigation

The aids to navigation depicted on the navigation guides comprise a system of fixed and floating aids to navigation. Prudent mariners will not rely solely on any single aid to navigation, particularly a floating aid to navigation. With respect to buoys, the buoy symbol is used to indicate the approximate position of the buoy body and the ground tackle which secures it to the lake or river bed. The approximate position is used because of the practical limitations in positioning and maintaining buoys in precise geographical locations. These limitations include, but are not limited to, prevailing atmospheric and lake/river conditions, the slope of and the material making up the lake/river bed, the fact that the buoys are moored to varying lengths of chain, and the fact that the buoy body and/or ground tackle positions are not under continuous surveillance. Due to the forces of nature, the position of the buoy body can be expected to shift inside and outside the charted symbol.

Buoys and perches are also moved out of position or pulled over by those mariners who use them to moor up to instead of anchoring. To this end, mariners should always monitor their passage by relating buoy/perch positions with the published navigation guide. Furthermore, a vessel attempting to pass close by always risks collision with a yawing buoy or with the obstruction that the buoy or beacon/perch marks.

Masters of Vessels are requested to use the most up to date Navigation guides when navigating on the Inland Waterways.

Information taken from Special Marine Notice No 1 of 2023