Mandatory fire detection on charter vessels should be “considered” by the Minister for Transport, according to a Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report into a potentially serious incident on the River Shannon.

Four people who had charted an inland cruising vessel had a narrow escape when a fire broke out in the engine compartment last September.

All four were taken on board a passing charter boat, and the vessel sank in eight metres of water.

The MCIB report into the incident notes that charter vessels are not considered passenger vessels and are not subject to the requirements of the Merchant Shipping Act 1992.

“ Instead, charter vessels come under the legislative requirements and recommendations detailed in the Code of Practise (CoP) for recreational craft,” it notes.

This code does not provide for the mandatory fitting of fire detection systems on recreational craft, it says.

“ If this fire had started while any of the party were asleep then the consequences could have been more serious,” the MCIB report says.

The incident occurred on September 6th, 2020, when four people were on board a Linssen Grand Sturdy 35.0 motor cruiser rented the previous day.

The group had left Carrick-on-Shannon, Co Leitrim, and was heading south when approximately 45 minutes into their journey, near Jamestown, a fire broke out in the engine compartment.

The group stopped the boat and turned off the engine, the report notes.

“ As the vessel drifted to the side of the river, they re-started the engine and manoeuvred to the centre of the river again,” it says.

“ One of the party went to get the anchor which was stored in a locker under the saloon floor. At this point they found the compartment was full of smoke, so much so that it prevented them from getting the anchor out,” the report says.

“The vessel “X4” did not have a fire detection system onboard to give an early warning of a fire and there is no requirement in the CoP to have one installed,” it says.

“ After approximately ten minutes, and while standing on the swim platform on the stern of the vessel, the clients heard an audible alarm before leaving the vessel,” it says.

This was the alarm for the automatic fire extinguisher which is thermally activated once the temperature has risen to 80°C.

“The customers, already wearing their personal flotation devices ( PFDs) phoned the out of hours number for the charterers, Carrickcraft, but there was no answer,” the report says.

“ They then called the phone number for the Banagher Carrickcraft office and spoke to a member of staff. The staff member told them to drive the boat to the shore and get off the boat “as soon as possible”, and even suggested they jump into the water,” it says.

“ The service boat was launched in Carrick-on-Shannon, and staff proceeded downriver to meet the clients, as they understood from the clients that they were not near a mooring,”it says.

“When the Carrickcraft service boat arrived, the clients had already left the boat and had been brought to the nearest mooring at the end of Jamestown Canal. The mooring is 150 m from where the boat then was, but it is not immediately visible from the Shannon river,” it says.

“A Garda Síochána were already on the scene, as was the fire brigade, having been notified by a member of the public. Once the fire brigade established that all of the clients were accounted for, they set about getting access, via a farmer’s field, to the boat which was close to shore at this point,” it says.

The group was brought to a local, and soon after the fire was extinguished by the fire brigade the boat started to sink.

The fire onboard the cruiser was extinguished by the fire brigade Photo: via MCIB report

On October 12th, 2020, the owners appointed a salvage contractor, who successfully lifted the vessel from the river bottom, and it was lifted out at the Carrickcraft base in Carrick-on-Shannon.

“ A forensic investigator attended the vessel from Zetetech Forensic Investigators to assess the damage for the insurance company, inspecting it on October 29th and November 17th 2020.

The investigator considered the most likely cause of fire to be a defect in the electrical installation of the vessel.

“However, due to the severity of fire damage sustained and the subsequent sinking of the vessel physical evidence of a specific defect has not been found,” the assessor’s report stated.

“Overheating at connections on timer components associated with the thrusters was observed on a sister vessel,” the assessor noted, recommending that the electrical installations of all similar vessels are fully inspected and certified to ensure no defects are present and any incipient defects are rectified.

The MCIB has recommended that Carrickcraft should employ the services of an independent qualified marine electrician to inspect the remaining Linssen 35 vessels in their fleet.

It says the Minister for Transport “should consider making regulations to govern the safe use of recreational craft being used for commercial purposes, which should include mandatory fire detection on vessels used for charter purposes”.

It also says the minister should “consider issuing a marine notice about the potential risks of electrical issues with similar craft”, and should send a copy of the MCIB’s report to the manufacturer, Linssen Yachts BV.

In a brief comment on the report, Carrickraft described it as “excellent” and had only one comment to make in relation to the battery isolation switch. It said this was not “extra” but a replacement and change of location of the original switch.

Linssen Yachts said it had been producing over 500 of this series of craft since 2005, for private and charter use, and up to now the company had not experienced a similar fire on these vessels.

It said for safety reasons, it had checked several used yachts at its shipyard with the same type of shower pump timer relay and there was no visible damage or previous overheating of same.

In relation to the battery isolation switch, Linssen Yachts said the bow and stern thruster were used more intensively in charter than in private deployment of these vessels. Both being 12 volt, the thrusters require “a lot of current” which may lead to wear out of the main switch with intensive use.

The company said, “the main switch has probably been exchanged on the boat in question”.

A fishing vessel which sank off the Wexford coast last January should have issued a “Pan Pan” alert, a report by the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) has noted.

Four crew on board the FV Aztec were transferred successfully to a paired vessel, FV Western Dawn, after the incident occurred at approximately 11 am on January 11th, 2021.

The position was 500m south of Duncannon Fort in Co Wexford and weather was calm with a westerly force four and slight sea state.

The 11.89-metre trawler with a GRP hull was rigged for mid-water sprat fishing with FV Western Dawn”.

FV Aztec Photo: via MCIB Report

It had in the region of ten tonnes of sprat onboard and was due to offload the catch later in the day at Duncannon harbour, the report says.

The MCIB describes it as “a very serious marine casualty resulting in the loss of the vessel”.

It says both vessels had been pair trawling for sprat at this time of year for the past eight years, and the skippers and crews of both vessels were “familiar with the processes involved in this type of pair trawling”.

It says there were “no risk assessments or method statements for pair trawling listed in the FV Aztec’s safety statement”, and says “effective risk assessments and procedures would have highlighted dangers associated with pair trawling”.

The report says the vessel was heavily laden at the time and dependant on the buoyancy provided by the steering compartment to maintain its longitudinal stability.

“ Although not required, the FV Aztec had stability calculations done in 2017 for a condition with ten tonnes of fish in the hold. These stability calculations concentrated on lateral stability and did not address longitudinal aspects of stability,”it says.

“ Although no limits are set for vessels of this size, the loading of the vessel was a contributory factor in the sinking,” the MCIB report says.

“ This must take into account the weight of the catch onboard as well as the positioning of fish in the hold. The effect of the additional catch being taken on board at the time of the incident will have also caused considerable settling by the stern and listing to starboard,” it says.

“The combination of these forces will have left the longitudinal stability of the vessel dependant on the buoyancy provided by the steering compartment,”it says.

A hole in the deck went unnoticed when it occurred and “should have merited further investigation”, it says.

It says no alert was sent out by the FV Aztec or by the FV Western Dawn, and the first notification of the foundering of the vessel to MRCC Dublin was from the shore.

“ Although there was no imminent danger to life, as a serious incident occurred, a Pan-Pan alert should have been raised with the Coast Guard,” it says.

It says the steering compartment of the FV Aztec had no bilge alarm fitted, and no means of directly pumping out this compartment, and notes that a small drain hole allowed water to drain from the steering compartment onto the fish hold.

The report recommends that the Minister for Transport should issue a marine notice to owners/skippers of fishing vessels reminding them to be aware of the safe loading capacity of their vessels.

It says owners and skippers should be advised to be aware - where the stability in a loaded state is dependent on a compartment’s watertight integrity - it is advisable that the compartment is alarmed and has a means of being pumped out.

It recommends the minister issue a marine notice to owners/skippers of fishing vessels reminding them that where an area of the deck is subjected to regular working and shock loading, consideration should be given to re-enforcing and strengthening that area.

It says the Minister should review the Code of Practice for fishing vessels under 15 metres to take into account heave loadings on decks during fishing operations.

It also says the code should be reviewed to take into account the maximum load of bulk fish a vessel is authorised to carry.

The annual report of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) for last year came a bit late this year to make as much impact as it could. It arrived in my email at the start of the month, a time when sailing and many watersports are not particularly active as the season has wound down and boats are laid up.

The Board has had a bit of a torrid time over the European Court decision on the appointment of new members, and legislation in this regard was still passing through the Dáil when the report was published. Also still in train was the review ordered by Transport Minister Eamon Ryan, to assess current organisational structures for marine casualty investigation in Ireland.

However, these should not take from the warnings of Board Chairperson Claire Callanan about the dangers in watersports. She includes sailing in her list, with rowing, canoeing and kayaking.

"The occurrence of so many incidents involving sailing, rowing, canoeing and kayaking in the last few years is of particular safety concern," she wrote in her introductory note to the report. "The MCIB is strongly encouraging all organisations, "especially clubs and commercial entities associated with water sports and water recreational activities, to audit their safety systems and to have regard to the Code of Practice and all guidelines or recommendations issued by any governing sports bodies. Safety in this sector is a particular concern. It highlights the dangers associated with activities that people participate in at many levels, including recreational and sporting. "It is imperative that any individual or group engaged in this activity realise the importance of adequate route planning and has an understanding of the watercourse," she wrote.

"incidents involving sailing, rowing, canoeing & kayaking is of particular safety concern"

This is also a trend reported by marine casualty investigation organisations around Europe. That is advice that clubs will have to take aboard. There is a factor to be considered, and that is the increased recreational activity on the water arising from stay-at-home holidays due to the Covid pandemic.

Clubs and sailing schools

That also highlights the importance of club membership and training. Clubs and sailing schools make safety on the water a vital issue for members. Those not members of clubs don't have to adhere to and may not be aware of safety requirements.

Reclassifying jet skis

One other safety aspect which needs attention is whether Ireland should follow the UK decision to take action to control jet skis, where there does not seem to be strong organisational usage control. The UK's Department of Transport has announced that it intends to "reclassify jet skis, speed boats and other recreational and personal watercraft to make users subject to the same laws and safety obligations as applied to those who operate ships. This would clamp down on dangerous, reckless driving of jet skis to protect the public and coastal areas," it says.

The UK Royal Yachting Association, while supporting the change, says the definition of watercraft is too broad and could affect other craft not causing problems. "There are aspects which are not appropriate for all watercraft. We have suggested changes," the RYA says.

An investigation into the death of a Galway fisherman who became entangled in gear off Salthill last year has found the weather deteriorated “significantly” after the vessel which he fished with his father left the harbour.

Tom Oliver (37), a relative of the Olivers who rescued two paddleboarders in Galway Bay in August 2020, died after he was dragged over the stern of the six-metre fishing vessel Myia on November 2nd 2020.

His father Martin, who was almost 62, was found dead at home the following morning.

After the incident, the then Mayor of Galway Mike Cubbard paid tribute to the two men as “salt of the earth” and “the best of friends”.

Cubbard noted that it was only a few weeks since he had recognised the role of their relatives, Patrick and Morgan Oliver, in rescuing paddleboarders Sara Feeney and Ellen Glynn after 15 hours at sea.

Several generations of the Oliver family have been associated with the RNLI lifeboat service, and members of the RNLI and the fishing communities along the coast and on the Aran Islands were among hundreds who attended the funeral of the father and son.

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report into the incident said that “violent movements” generated by the worsening sea conditions while feeding out shrimp pots may have been a contributory factor.

The use of a mobile phone to generate a distress call, instead of a Mayday call over VHF radio, “added some delay, however short, in the alert of the emergency services”, the report found.

The report said a Mayday call over VHF radio would have been picked up immediately by Valentia Coast Guard, leading to immediate activation of the lifeboat crew pagers.

It said that activation of a personal locator beacon, which can be fitted to a PFD or lifejacket, would also have triggered an instant distress call.

It said the casualty was not wearing a personal flotation device (PFD) or lifejacket while operating on an open deck in hazardous conditions.

“Wearing a suitably specified and fitted PFD would have greatly improved his chances of survival,” the report stated.

The report noted that the crew were very experienced at potting in the Galway Bay area, and had been working on the twin-hulled vessel FV Myia for ten years, fishing lobster in summer and shrimp during the winter.

The report said that the weather “deteriorated considerably between the time the vessel left the harbour at midday on November 2nd, 2020, and the time of the incident.

“As seen in the Met Éireann weather report at the time of the incident there were near gale force winds, heavy rainfall, and rough seas,” it said.

“ These conditions were extremely challenging for a vessel of this size and construction and would have led to violent movements,” it said.

It noted that there are no manufacturers recommendations on the operational limitations of this type of vessel, and the manufacturing company is no longer in existence.

The report recalled that at approximately 1.30 pm, the men were resetting a train of pots when Tom Oliver got entangled in rope attached to the train of pots.

“ The weight of the train of pots combined with the forward motion of the vessel quickly pulled him overboard and under the water,” it said.

The Galway RNLI lifeboat operations manager was contacted by mobile phone, and he requested activation of pagers for an immediate launch of the inshore lifeboat.

It arrived quickly on the scene, and the lifeboat crew found the casualty caught in ropes and unconscious in the water.

The lifeboat crew got the casualty on board and immediately began cardiopulmonary resuscitation. It requested an ambulance, which met it at the lifeboat station.

Tom Oliver was brought to Galway University Hospital where he was pronounced dead.

The lifeboat then launched again to escort the fishing vessel Myia back to the harbour.

The MCIB recommends that the Minister for Transport should issue marine notices reminding fishing crew of the obligation to wear a PFD while working on open decks, and of the dangers associated with snagging in gear while setting trains of pots.

It also recommends that the minister issue marine notices to encourage use of VHF radio for distress calls, to point out the limitations of mobile phones for this purpose, and to advise fishers to know the limitations of vessels and to be aware always of weather forecasts before going to sea.

Transport Minister Eamon Ryan has today (Thursday 11 November) announced the publication of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) (Amendment) Bill 2021, which provides for a number of amendments to the legislation that underpins the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB).

Changes will facilitate the appointment of new members to the board and are aimed at supporting its independent functioning as the State’s marine casualty investigative body.

The move follows a Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgment in July 2020 concerning the independence of the MCIB, as previously reported on Afloat.ie.

“The bill is being progressed to ensure the continued independent functioning of the MCIB in the immediate term as the marine investigative body in the State and to meet international and EU requirements to have an independent marine casualty investigative body in place,” Minister Ryan said.

Separate to the bill, the Department of Transport said it is reviewing organisational structures for marine casualty investigation in Ireland which may lead to further legislative change.

However, as the minister noted: “There is an immediate need for the current bill to fill board vacancies and in particular to ensure that the quorum requirements for board meetings are met.”

The text of the bill is available on the Oireachtas website and a Regulatory Impact Analysis on the bill is available from Gov.ie.

The MCIB was established in 2002 under the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000. The purpose of the MCIB is to investigate marine casualties with a view to learning lessons to prevent them happening again. It is not the purpose of an investigation to attribute fault or blame. The MCIB invites applications from suitably qualified investigators to carry out contracted marine casualty investigations on behalf of the Board.

To date, the MCIB has published approximately 243 accident investigation reports and now wishes to engage additional investigators to carry out accident investigations on its behalf and to develop reports for the MCIB.

Details about the MCIB, its annual reports and its investigation reports can be accessed at www.mcib.ie.

An investigator will be selected to carry out an investigation based on the competencies needed to carry out the investigation. The role of the investigator will include:

o Investigating under warrant marine casualties in accordance with the relevant legislation including the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000, the IMO Code, EU Directive 2009/18/EC incorporated into Irish laws by S.I. 276 of 2011 – European Communities (Merchant Shipping) (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 2011 and the EU Common Methodology.

• Preparing and submitting draft reports to the MCIB in accordance with the requirements of Annex 1 of EC2009/18/EC, and the MCIB Style Guide.
• Addressing any matters raised by the MCIB.
• Addressing any matters resulting from the consultation procedure set out in Section 36 of The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000, which the MCIB refers to the investigator.
• Working with the MCIB to conclude investigations and create reports that achieve the objectives of the MCIB.
• Carrying out other investigator type functions as may be determined by the MCIB from time to time including acting as a support or providing assistance to the investigator appointed under warrant, and/or co-operating on another investigation or report.

For more information, and to apply, see www.etenders.gov.ie and search ID number 201227. or click here. The closing date for applications is Tuesday 30th November at 16.00 hrs.

An investigation into an incident where a party of 15 kayakers encountered difficulties during a round trip from Bulloch harbour to Dalkey island on Dublin Bay last September has found that “disregard for Met Éireann forecasts” contributed to a decision to embark on a “potentially unsafe tour”.

All kayakers returned or were rescued in the incident which occurred on the evening of September 13th, 2020, but one of the kayakers was in the water for 40 minutes and unable to return independently.

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report published yesterday (October 28th) notes that while a small craft warning was not in place earlier that evening, it was in place by the time the group was setting out to sea.

The MCIB says that an” apparent complete disregard” for the instructor training regime run by Canoeing Ireland (CI), the national governing body for kayaking, “seems to have contributed to the decision to embark on a potentially unsafe tour”.

A photo of two canoes ashore at Bulloch Harbour from the MCIB report

The party of 15 kayakers involved three instructors and 12 participants on a guided kayak coastal trip from Bulloch Harbour to Dalkey Island and back of approximately 2.86 nautical miles.

Both kayaks with cockpits and “sit-on-top” kayaks were used, the report says.

After leaving Bulloch harbour, the kayakers became separated into two groups with a “small group drifting northwards” and a “large group” making its way “(eventually) to the north end of Loreto Convent”.

Three “999” calls alerted the rescue services to the incident, recording "concern on the part of members of the public that the kayakers were struggling”.

The calls said that “some had become separated from the main group and were drifting towards Dublin harbour; that one seemed to have capsized; that a kayaker appeared to be in the water; that the instructors were rushing to assist; that the “small boat” (presumably a reference to the Royal National Lifeboat Institution inshore lifeboat should be sent to assist; and that the kayakers were in trouble”.

One of the kayakers capsized three times. An Irish Coast Guard ((ICG) rescue helicopter, RNLI all weather (ALB) and inshore (ILB) lifeboats and a land-based Irish Coast Guard crew responded, as did the tour organiser who paddled out to bring a group of nine kayakers ashore at Loreto College. However, in emails to the MCIB investigator, the organiser says her concern for the group's safety was "nothing to do with my tour or the conditions".

"It was caused in its entirety by the disruption to their equilibrium with the sudden and unnecessary arrival in our space of the ICG search and rescue helicopter, the RNLI ALB and the ILB lifeboats and the ICG land-based vehicle," she states.

"The approaching tsunami of rescue services swarming around my guests suggested an urgent and imminent danger where none existed," she stated by email.

The investigation was unable to determine the precise level of skills of all instructors, and notes that at least two of the participants did not have sufficient experience for the conditions.

It says “the qualifications ascribed by the organiser’s observations to one or other of the instructors (kayaking level 3 sea skills, kayaking level 4 training and kayaking level 2 instructor) “did not meet the appropriate qualifications recommended by CI for an instructor taking out a group in conditions similar to those which were encountered on the tour”.

The weather report was noted moderate to fresh winds of Beaufort force 4 or 5.

It says the organiser’s observations did not refer to the Code of Practice for safe operation of recreational craft, and the report says “it is reasonable to assume that no regard was had to its contents” and that this contributed to the decision to embark on a “potentially unsafe tour”.

A fisherman who assisted one of the two groups of kayakers recalled that local conditions were such that the combination of an ebb tide with wind from the south/south west had the effect of wind against tide giving rise to “white horses” and a sea swell of approximately 1.5 metre, the report says.

“While this contradicts the data evident from the tidal streams... challenging sea conditions were encountered,” it says.

It says the overall ratio of participants to instructors was in keeping with that identified by CI’s website, namely a ratio of 1:4.

The report says two of the participants indicated that no warnings were given to them that they would become immersed in the water, and that “they were not told what to do in the event of their becoming immersed in the water”.

It says the fisherman “noted that the female kayakers whom he took on board were tired, cold, wet and fatigued and would not have made it ashore on their own”.

The report says that one of these was “in an uncontrolled situation in and out of the water for a period of approximately 40 minutes”.

This participant told the report of feeling “in deep water” shortly after leaving the calm of Bulloch harbour “in the sense that she believed she had no control over the direction of her kayak and that the waves were taking her where they wanted”.

She “recalled being terrified, not being able to speak and having to try to attract the attention of the instructors by waving her hands”.

A big wave flipped her over and her personal flotation device “burst open”, but still remained on her upper body.

She was separated from her kayak for a time, swallowed sea water when swimming back to it, and was “coughing and expending energy” in a bid to keep her head above water, before being assisted.

Two instructors were unsuccessful in addressing the situation, it says, and when the third instructor arrived – leaving the larger group unsupervised, or supervised by the organiser who had to paddle out to them – the kayaker described having to be held in her craft by that instructor.

She was treated by two ambulance paramedics on her arrival back at Bulloch harbour, and recalled they were concerned with the amount of sea water she had swallowed.

The larger group drifted towards rocks, and the organiser paddled out to meet them. The report quotes a participant in this larger group recalling that when they disembarked on the rocks, an Irish Coast Guard officer instructed them to wait where they were, and to get onto a lifeboat which would be along shortly.

“This instruction.... was countermanded by the organiser who instructed them to make their way over the rocks, on foot,” the report states.

The investigation was told that another participant in the large group asked the Irish Coast Guard officer and the organiser “to stop giving conflicting orders as it was confusing”.

“This participant’s recollection was that she would have preferred to follow the directions of the Irish Coast Guard, as she was not happy about climbing over the rocks as she did not have proper footwear and she was anxious and fearful about slipping”.

“According to this participant, the organiser was adamant that the large group should climb over the rocks and the large group duly did so, without incident,” it says.

“They were unable to access a gate through a wall at the top of the rocks and had to make their way around the wall onto other (less slippery) rocks and then onto a flat shore where they were met by the Irish Coast Guard officer,” it says.

It says the organiser took issue with the Irish Coast Guard officer’s use of the word “hypothermia” in a radio report..

The report says that “as no records were made available, it has not been possible to determine what contingency planning was in place”.

It says that the forms signed by any of the participants on the tour were not provided to the investigator.

“According to one participant, she completed a form for her first excursion with the organiser a month previously but did not complete a second for the tour while the other participant does not recall completing any form,” the report says.

“ The form contains a detailed purported waiver of any liability on the part of the organiser. It is not the function of this report to comment on its legal validity,” it says.

The report also notes that “a waiver of liability form is not a substitute for the proper assessment of conditions and participants in a sporting or recreational activity on the water”.

The organiser, who was not one of the instructors, denied that one of the participants was in the water for 40 minutes.

The organiser stated of this participant that “on the 13 September we had a client who was not keen to get back into her kayak and who was feeling tired”.

“She was eventually returned to her kayak with the help of three instructors. If one floats in the sea, the effect of wind and water will carry you somewhere. That is the nature of floating in the sea. It doesn't mean that the conditions were inappropriate,” the organiser said.

The report also quotes the organiser as saying “one woman capsized more than once and needed some convincing to get back into her kayak. I have no wish to embarrass anyone and I don't see the need to say any more other than she was eventually returned to her kayak, and that she was not in the water for 40 minutes, though she was in the water for longer than usual”.

It also says there appears to be no record of any communication over VHF between the tour group and the organiser or instructors, such VHF “traffic” as is recorded on the Irish Coast Guard SITREP and report exchanged between the emergency and rescue services and the fisherman to coordinate the operation.

The report notes several draft reports preceded the final report, and changes were made “where they were warranted”.

It says the organiser detailed her own qualifications, stating “I am a level 4 instructor and hold the highest level skills award which is level 5”. She also said she is a tutor and can train and assess instructors.

It said that the organiser “does not consider regard should be had to CI, as she asserts that the current awards are “not fit for purpose for tour guiding as opposed to providing more in depth instruction”.” It says the organiser stated that a capsize drill is carried out at the harbour, but “no information has been provided as to who gave this instruction for this tour, nor as to what the content was on the date in question”.

It quotes one participant as stating no capsize drill took place.

It says that during the course of the investigation, the organiser of the tour was asked to provide certain records within the meaning of Section 30(1) the 2000 Act and to provide any additional information relating to the incident. It says “no such records or additional information were made available, over and above various statements about the incident made by the organiser in written exchanges in which she raised a number of issues.

The report says that on December 18th, 2020, the organiser wrote to the deputy director of the Irish Coast Guard requesting the “retraction, withdrawal and correction of the IRCG SITREP” for the incident.

The report makes a number of recommendations in relation to more effective delivery of the Code of Practice safety content, and says “consideration should be given to the establishment of a directory of commercial providers of coastal sea and river paddle facilities”.

The report says “consideration should be given to how best to enhance safety standards within the commercial paddlesport provider sector, including whether a mandatory registration or licencing scheme which requires the registration of instructors and their qualifications should be introduced”.

It says “consideration should be given to a mandatory requirement that commercial providers of coastal sea kayaking facilities register in advance with the local Coast Guard to ensure that the rescue services are aware, in advance, of the group’s itinerary, departure and return times, as well as numbers in the group”.

It says mandatory use of suitably licensed VHF radios by commercial providers of coastal sea kayaking facilities should be considered.

It says that CI in conjunction with Sports Ireland should “consider establishing a programme” to facilitate it in “establishing a scheme for the mandatory audit of safety policies and practises in clubs in collaboration with related sport national governing body, and, insofar as it is possible, the audit of instructors in commercial paddlesport providers”.

It says CI should consider “whether a safety audit and compliance system could be developed within its instructor training and registration system so that registered instructors have training in relation to safety requirements including those in the Code of Practice and Marine Notices, and so that CI could better contribute to safety through its regulation of its accreditation and registration system”.

The 240-page report includes lengthy appendices exchanges of communications between the organiser and the investigator. The report is downloadable from the MCIB website here

The Department of Transport is reminding all fishing vessel owners, operators, skippers and crew of the hazards associated with trawling, including beam trawling and scallop dredging.

It follows the report in August from the Maritime Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) into the sinking of the FV Alize off Hook Head early last year, which also recently prompted an advisory on the correct use of lifejackets and personal flotation devices on fishing vessels.

As previously reported on Afloat.ie, two fishermen died after the FV Alize sank while fishing for scallops out of Duncannon, Co Wexford on 4 January 2020.

Joe Sinnott was recovered from the scene by the Irish Coast Guard’s Waterford-based helicopter Rescue 117 but was later pronounced dead at University Hospital Waterford.

The body of skipper Willie Whelan was found trapped behind equipment on the deck of the sunken vessel and was recovered by divers on 28 January 2020.

The MCIB report concluded that the FV Alize capsized and sank quickly and without warning while hauling its final trawl, most likely due to a stability issue.

Marine Notice No 53 of 2021, which can be downloaded below, outlines a number of safety measures for all voyages that involve trawling or beam trawling.

These include awareness of the dangers of equipment failure and of conditions that can affect stability such as use of fuel and stowage of fish.

The Department of Transport has issued a new Marine Notice on the correct use of lifejackets or personal flotation devices (PFDs) on fishing vessels.

It follows the report earlier this month from the Maritime Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) into the sinking of the FV Alize off Hook Head early last year.

Two fishermen died after the FV Alize sank while fishing for scallops out of Duncannon, Co Wexford on 4 January 2020.

Joe Sinnott was recovered from the scene by the Irish Coast Guard’s Waterford-based helicopter Rescue 117 but was later pronounced dead at University Hospital Waterford.

The body of skipper Willie Whelan was found trapped behind equipment on the deck of the sunken vessel and was recovered by divers on 28 January 2020.

The MCIB report concluded that the FV Alize capsized and sank quickly and without warning while hauling its final trawl, most likely due to a stability issue.

It determined that the boat was operating below its optimum level of three crew, and that the two fishermen on board were not trained in stability awareness and likely fatigued after 36 hours at sea.

In addition, it found that the two crew’s likelihood of survival was reduced by not having any time to respond and broadcast a distress message — but also by not complying with safety regulations which mandate the wearing of a lifejacket or personal flotation device.

Marine Notice No 48 of 2021 (which can be downloaded below, and which supersedes No 34 of 2017) reminds all fishing vessel owners, operators, skippers, crew and course training providers that every person on board a fishing vessel must wear a suitable PDF when in deck (or, in the case of an open undecked vessel, at all times on board).

Such inflatable PFDs must be worn over, not under, all items of clothing and should be fitted with a hold-down deice such as a crotch strap or thigh straps.

The MCIB report also recommends warning owners and operators of small fishing vessels (under 15m in length overall) of “the hazards associated with trawling, including beam trawling and scallop dredging”, and that the relevant Code of Practice for the design, build and operation of such vessels be updated “to reflect the importance of periodic examination and testing of lifting equipment”.

Meanwhile, it’s recommended that the Minister for Transport should adopt Actions 9 stated in the Maritime Safety Strategy in respect of stability standards, stability criteria and crew training for small fishing vessels.

The latest Marine Notice from the Department of Transport calls on the owners, operators, skippers and crews of fishing vessels to prepare passage plans as well as contingencies or groundings or collisions.

It comes in the wake of recommendations from the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) in its report on an incident involving the FV Dearbhla in the Blasket Islands in May last year.

As previously reported on Afloat.ie, the 23-metre trawler ran struck rocks near Inis na Bró on 14 May 2020 while no crew member was alert at the helm.

It emerged that the vessel had no tea-maker in the wheelhouse, so the crew member on watch had gone to his bunk to make tea and failed to turn on the watch alarm on his return, and fell asleep shortly after — meaning that a required course correction on approach to the Blaskets was not made.

In response to the report’s findings and recommendations, Marine Notice No 11 of 2021 reminds all fishing vessel owners, operators, skippers and crew:

• To ensure all navigation is planned in adequate detail and that passage plans, with contingency plans where appropriate, are compiled and made known to the crew of the vessel. Afloat.ie has more HERE.
• To develop contingency plans and procedures for a grounding event or collision incident, as previously highlighted on Afloat.ie.

The department also wishes to remind all of the statutory requirements pertaining to training, drills and musters, as well as the reporting obligations for incidents at sea.

Full details can be found in Marine Notice No 11 of 2021, a PDF of which can be downloaded below.