An investigation into an incident where a party of 15 kayakers encountered difficulties during a round trip from Bulloch harbour to Dalkey island on Dublin Bay last September has found that “disregard for Met Éireann forecasts” contributed to a decision to embark on a “potentially unsafe tour”.

All kayakers returned or were rescued in the incident which occurred on the evening of September 13th, 2020, but one of the kayakers was in the water for 40 minutes and unable to return independently.

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report published yesterday (October 28th) notes that while a small craft warning was not in place earlier that evening, it was in place by the time the group was setting out to sea.

The MCIB says that an” apparent complete disregard” for the instructor training regime run by Canoeing Ireland (CI), the national governing body for kayaking, “seems to have contributed to the decision to embark on a potentially unsafe tour”.

A photo of two canoes ashore at Bulloch Harbour from the MCIB report

The party of 15 kayakers involved three instructors and 12 participants on a guided kayak coastal trip from Bulloch Harbour to Dalkey Island and back of approximately 2.86 nautical miles.

Both kayaks with cockpits and “sit-on-top” kayaks were used, the report says.

After leaving Bulloch harbour, the kayakers became separated into two groups with a “small group drifting northwards” and a “large group” making its way “(eventually) to the north end of Loreto Convent”.

Three “999” calls alerted the rescue services to the incident, recording "concern on the part of members of the public that the kayakers were struggling”.

The calls said that “some had become separated from the main group and were drifting towards Dublin harbour; that one seemed to have capsized; that a kayaker appeared to be in the water; that the instructors were rushing to assist; that the “small boat” (presumably a reference to the Royal National Lifeboat Institution inshore lifeboat should be sent to assist; and that the kayakers were in trouble”.

One of the kayakers capsized three times. An Irish Coast Guard ((ICG) rescue helicopter, RNLI all weather (ALB) and inshore (ILB) lifeboats and a land-based Irish Coast Guard crew responded, as did the tour organiser who paddled out to bring a group of nine kayakers ashore at Loreto College. However, in emails to the MCIB investigator, the organiser says her concern for the group's safety was "nothing to do with my tour or the conditions".

"It was caused in its entirety by the disruption to their equilibrium with the sudden and unnecessary arrival in our space of the ICG search and rescue helicopter, the RNLI ALB and the ILB lifeboats and the ICG land-based vehicle," she states.

"The approaching tsunami of rescue services swarming around my guests suggested an urgent and imminent danger where none existed," she stated by email.

The investigation was unable to determine the precise level of skills of all instructors, and notes that at least two of the participants did not have sufficient experience for the conditions.

It says “the qualifications ascribed by the organiser’s observations to one or other of the instructors (kayaking level 3 sea skills, kayaking level 4 training and kayaking level 2 instructor) “did not meet the appropriate qualifications recommended by CI for an instructor taking out a group in conditions similar to those which were encountered on the tour”.

The weather report was noted moderate to fresh winds of Beaufort force 4 or 5.

It says the organiser’s observations did not refer to the Code of Practice for safe operation of recreational craft, and the report says “it is reasonable to assume that no regard was had to its contents” and that this contributed to the decision to embark on a “potentially unsafe tour”.

A fisherman who assisted one of the two groups of kayakers recalled that local conditions were such that the combination of an ebb tide with wind from the south/south west had the effect of wind against tide giving rise to “white horses” and a sea swell of approximately 1.5 metre, the report says.

“While this contradicts the data evident from the tidal streams... challenging sea conditions were encountered,” it says.

It says the overall ratio of participants to instructors was in keeping with that identified by CI’s website, namely a ratio of 1:4.

The report says two of the participants indicated that no warnings were given to them that they would become immersed in the water, and that “they were not told what to do in the event of their becoming immersed in the water”.

It says the fisherman “noted that the female kayakers whom he took on board were tired, cold, wet and fatigued and would not have made it ashore on their own”.

The report says that one of these was “in an uncontrolled situation in and out of the water for a period of approximately 40 minutes”.

This participant told the report of feeling “in deep water” shortly after leaving the calm of Bulloch harbour “in the sense that she believed she had no control over the direction of her kayak and that the waves were taking her where they wanted”.

She “recalled being terrified, not being able to speak and having to try to attract the attention of the instructors by waving her hands”.

A big wave flipped her over and her personal flotation device “burst open”, but still remained on her upper body.

She was separated from her kayak for a time, swallowed sea water when swimming back to it, and was “coughing and expending energy” in a bid to keep her head above water, before being assisted.

Two instructors were unsuccessful in addressing the situation, it says, and when the third instructor arrived – leaving the larger group unsupervised, or supervised by the organiser who had to paddle out to them – the kayaker described having to be held in her craft by that instructor.

She was treated by two ambulance paramedics on her arrival back at Bulloch harbour, and recalled they were concerned with the amount of sea water she had swallowed.

The larger group drifted towards rocks, and the organiser paddled out to meet them. The report quotes a participant in this larger group recalling that when they disembarked on the rocks, an Irish Coast Guard officer instructed them to wait where they were, and to get onto a lifeboat which would be along shortly.

“This instruction.... was countermanded by the organiser who instructed them to make their way over the rocks, on foot,” the report states.

The investigation was told that another participant in the large group asked the Irish Coast Guard officer and the organiser “to stop giving conflicting orders as it was confusing”.

“This participant’s recollection was that she would have preferred to follow the directions of the Irish Coast Guard, as she was not happy about climbing over the rocks as she did not have proper footwear and she was anxious and fearful about slipping”.

“According to this participant, the organiser was adamant that the large group should climb over the rocks and the large group duly did so, without incident,” it says.

“They were unable to access a gate through a wall at the top of the rocks and had to make their way around the wall onto other (less slippery) rocks and then onto a flat shore where they were met by the Irish Coast Guard officer,” it says.

It says the organiser took issue with the Irish Coast Guard officer’s use of the word “hypothermia” in a radio report..

The report says that “as no records were made available, it has not been possible to determine what contingency planning was in place”.

It says that the forms signed by any of the participants on the tour were not provided to the investigator.

“According to one participant, she completed a form for her first excursion with the organiser a month previously but did not complete a second for the tour while the other participant does not recall completing any form,” the report says.

“ The form contains a detailed purported waiver of any liability on the part of the organiser. It is not the function of this report to comment on its legal validity,” it says.

The report also notes that “a waiver of liability form is not a substitute for the proper assessment of conditions and participants in a sporting or recreational activity on the water”.

The organiser, who was not one of the instructors, denied that one of the participants was in the water for 40 minutes.

The organiser stated of this participant that “on the 13 September we had a client who was not keen to get back into her kayak and who was feeling tired”.

“She was eventually returned to her kayak with the help of three instructors. If one floats in the sea, the effect of wind and water will carry you somewhere. That is the nature of floating in the sea. It doesn't mean that the conditions were inappropriate,” the organiser said.

The report also quotes the organiser as saying “one woman capsized more than once and needed some convincing to get back into her kayak. I have no wish to embarrass anyone and I don't see the need to say any more other than she was eventually returned to her kayak, and that she was not in the water for 40 minutes, though she was in the water for longer than usual”.

It also says there appears to be no record of any communication over VHF between the tour group and the organiser or instructors, such VHF “traffic” as is recorded on the Irish Coast Guard SITREP and report exchanged between the emergency and rescue services and the fisherman to coordinate the operation.

The report notes several draft reports preceded the final report, and changes were made “where they were warranted”.

It says the organiser detailed her own qualifications, stating “I am a level 4 instructor and hold the highest level skills award which is level 5”. She also said she is a tutor and can train and assess instructors.

It said that the organiser “does not consider regard should be had to CI, as she asserts that the current awards are “not fit for purpose for tour guiding as opposed to providing more in depth instruction”.” It says the organiser stated that a capsize drill is carried out at the harbour, but “no information has been provided as to who gave this instruction for this tour, nor as to what the content was on the date in question”.

It quotes one participant as stating no capsize drill took place.

It says that during the course of the investigation, the organiser of the tour was asked to provide certain records within the meaning of Section 30(1) the 2000 Act and to provide any additional information relating to the incident. It says “no such records or additional information were made available, over and above various statements about the incident made by the organiser in written exchanges in which she raised a number of issues.

The report says that on December 18th, 2020, the organiser wrote to the deputy director of the Irish Coast Guard requesting the “retraction, withdrawal and correction of the IRCG SITREP” for the incident.

The report makes a number of recommendations in relation to more effective delivery of the Code of Practice safety content, and says “consideration should be given to the establishment of a directory of commercial providers of coastal sea and river paddle facilities”.

The report says “consideration should be given to how best to enhance safety standards within the commercial paddlesport provider sector, including whether a mandatory registration or licencing scheme which requires the registration of instructors and their qualifications should be introduced”.

It says “consideration should be given to a mandatory requirement that commercial providers of coastal sea kayaking facilities register in advance with the local Coast Guard to ensure that the rescue services are aware, in advance, of the group’s itinerary, departure and return times, as well as numbers in the group”.

It says mandatory use of suitably licensed VHF radios by commercial providers of coastal sea kayaking facilities should be considered.

It says that CI in conjunction with Sports Ireland should “consider establishing a programme” to facilitate it in “establishing a scheme for the mandatory audit of safety policies and practises in clubs in collaboration with related sport national governing body, and, insofar as it is possible, the audit of instructors in commercial paddlesport providers”.

It says CI should consider “whether a safety audit and compliance system could be developed within its instructor training and registration system so that registered instructors have training in relation to safety requirements including those in the Code of Practice and Marine Notices, and so that CI could better contribute to safety through its regulation of its accreditation and registration system”.

The 240-page report includes lengthy appendices exchanges of communications between the organiser and the investigator. The report is downloadable from the MCIB website here

The Department of Transport is reminding all fishing vessel owners, operators, skippers and crew of the hazards associated with trawling, including beam trawling and scallop dredging.

It follows the report in August from the Maritime Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) into the sinking of the FV Alize off Hook Head early last year, which also recently prompted an advisory on the correct use of lifejackets and personal flotation devices on fishing vessels.

As previously reported on Afloat.ie, two fishermen died after the FV Alize sank while fishing for scallops out of Duncannon, Co Wexford on 4 January 2020.

Joe Sinnott was recovered from the scene by the Irish Coast Guard’s Waterford-based helicopter Rescue 117 but was later pronounced dead at University Hospital Waterford.

The body of skipper Willie Whelan was found trapped behind equipment on the deck of the sunken vessel and was recovered by divers on 28 January 2020.

The MCIB report concluded that the FV Alize capsized and sank quickly and without warning while hauling its final trawl, most likely due to a stability issue.

Marine Notice No 53 of 2021, which can be downloaded below, outlines a number of safety measures for all voyages that involve trawling or beam trawling.

These include awareness of the dangers of equipment failure and of conditions that can affect stability such as use of fuel and stowage of fish.

The Department of Transport has issued a new Marine Notice on the correct use of lifejackets or personal flotation devices (PFDs) on fishing vessels.

It follows the report earlier this month from the Maritime Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) into the sinking of the FV Alize off Hook Head early last year.

Two fishermen died after the FV Alize sank while fishing for scallops out of Duncannon, Co Wexford on 4 January 2020.

Joe Sinnott was recovered from the scene by the Irish Coast Guard’s Waterford-based helicopter Rescue 117 but was later pronounced dead at University Hospital Waterford.

The body of skipper Willie Whelan was found trapped behind equipment on the deck of the sunken vessel and was recovered by divers on 28 January 2020.

The MCIB report concluded that the FV Alize capsized and sank quickly and without warning while hauling its final trawl, most likely due to a stability issue.

It determined that the boat was operating below its optimum level of three crew, and that the two fishermen on board were not trained in stability awareness and likely fatigued after 36 hours at sea.

In addition, it found that the two crew’s likelihood of survival was reduced by not having any time to respond and broadcast a distress message — but also by not complying with safety regulations which mandate the wearing of a lifejacket or personal flotation device.

Marine Notice No 48 of 2021 (which can be downloaded below, and which supersedes No 34 of 2017) reminds all fishing vessel owners, operators, skippers, crew and course training providers that every person on board a fishing vessel must wear a suitable PDF when in deck (or, in the case of an open undecked vessel, at all times on board).

Such inflatable PFDs must be worn over, not under, all items of clothing and should be fitted with a hold-down deice such as a crotch strap or thigh straps.

The MCIB report also recommends warning owners and operators of small fishing vessels (under 15m in length overall) of “the hazards associated with trawling, including beam trawling and scallop dredging”, and that the relevant Code of Practice for the design, build and operation of such vessels be updated “to reflect the importance of periodic examination and testing of lifting equipment”.

Meanwhile, it’s recommended that the Minister for Transport should adopt Actions 9 stated in the Maritime Safety Strategy in respect of stability standards, stability criteria and crew training for small fishing vessels.

The latest Marine Notice from the Department of Transport calls on the owners, operators, skippers and crews of fishing vessels to prepare passage plans as well as contingencies or groundings or collisions.

It comes in the wake of recommendations from the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) in its report on an incident involving the FV Dearbhla in the Blasket Islands in May last year.

As previously reported on Afloat.ie, the 23-metre trawler ran struck rocks near Inis na Bró on 14 May 2020 while no crew member was alert at the helm.

It emerged that the vessel had no tea-maker in the wheelhouse, so the crew member on watch had gone to his bunk to make tea and failed to turn on the watch alarm on his return, and fell asleep shortly after — meaning that a required course correction on approach to the Blaskets was not made.

In response to the report’s findings and recommendations, Marine Notice No 11 of 2021 reminds all fishing vessel owners, operators, skippers and crew:

• To ensure all navigation is planned in adequate detail and that passage plans, with contingency plans where appropriate, are compiled and made known to the crew of the vessel. Afloat.ie has more HERE.
• To develop contingency plans and procedures for a grounding event or collision incident, as previously highlighted on Afloat.ie.

The department also wishes to remind all of the statutory requirements pertaining to training, drills and musters, as well as the reporting obligations for incidents at sea.

Full details can be found in Marine Notice No 11 of 2021, a PDF of which can be downloaded below.

A collision involving a yacht and a tanker in August 2019 has prompted a reminder for boaters to brush up on the “rules of the road” for seafarers in the Department of Transport’s latest Marine Notice.

The 38ft yacht Medi Mode sustained extensive damage following the collision with the 88m chemical tanker off Greystones on the night of 23 August 2019. No one was injured in the incident.

As previously reported on Afloat.ie, the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report into the collision called on the Minister for Transport to alert recreational sailors and motorboat users to the need for “appropriate training” and compliance with international regulations on prevention of collisions at sea.

However, the two airline pilots who were sailing the yacht disputed the MCIB report’s criticism of their experience despite their lack of formal navigation qualifications.

Marine Notice No 05 of 2021 is available to download below.

Irish Coast Guard volunteer Bernard Lucas has called for a re-investigation into the cause of his wife Caitriona’s death off the Clare coast in 2016.

In an interview with today’s Sunday Independent, Mr Lucas says he finds as “shocking” the criticisms of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) in a report commissioned by maritime lawyer Michael Kingston.

The report by Capt Neil Forde of Marine Hazard Ltd said the MCIB was “not fit for purpose”.

It was submitted by Mr Michael Kingston to several Oireachtas committees, including the Transport and Communications Network committee which sat on Friday last.

Ms Lucas (41), a librarian, mother of two, and advanced coxswain, had offered to help out the neighbouring Irish Coast Guard Kilkee unit in a search for a missing man on September 12th, 2016.

She hadn’t expected to go to sea, but the unit was short a crew member. She died after the Kilkee rigid inflatable boat (Rib) capsized in a shallow surf zone. Two other crew members survived.

Last summer, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) decided that no criminal charges should be brought in relation to the incident after a report was forwarded to it by the Health and Safety Authority (HSA).

The unpublished HSA report was one of two separate investigations. The second report by the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) proved so contentious that it had to be published in two parts, and the responses to the draft were longer than the report itself.

In a robust response, the Irish Coast Guard described the MCIB report as “flawed” and “misleading”, and argued that it was a “significant leap” to draw wider conclusions about safety standards based on one “tragic accident”.

In his submission to the draft report, Bernard Lucas queried why the investigation did not address failure to find personal locator beacons and other equipment issues, including the loss of helmets by three crew and the failure of lifejackets to inflate.

A postmortem identified a trauma to the side of Ms Lucas’s head at a point where it should have been protected by her helmet.

Last summer, the MCIB’s authority was questioned in a European Court of Justice judgment which found it is not independent as its board included the Department of Transport secretary-general, or his or her deputy, and the Marine Survey Office (MSO) chief surveyor. These two post holders have recently stood down.

The report commissioned by Mr Kingston claims the MCIB failed to investigate certain incidents which it has a statutory duty to inquire about, it questions its resources and independence.

It also says the MCIB inquiry into Caitriona Lucas’s death is “riddled with inaccuracies” – starting with the wrong location for the incident.

These inaccuracies were not corrected, even when highlighted in responses to the draft report, because MCIB investigators” simply have not had the resources required to do the job properly”, Mr Kingston told the Oireachtas Transport and Communications Networks committee hearing on Friday.

Capt Forde’s analysis also questions why the MCIB did not also investigate a previous incident which occurred in similar circumstances to that of Ms Lucas’s death, where an Irish Coast Guard Dingle unit RIB capsized in a surf zone off Inch, Co Kerry in August 2014.

The MCIB said in response that it does not comment on published reports issued on the conclusion of investigations, and said it was not the purpose of an investigation to attribute blame or fault – but to avoid other casualties occurring.

“Any person may report a marine accident to the MCIB directly and details are on the website,”it said in response to questions about its failure to follow up on the Dingle incident.

“All on-going investigations are noted on the website and members of the public may submit evidence about an investigation at any time should they so wish,” it said.

“The board may also re open investigations where it receives evidence to warrant that course of action,” it said, but it was “not in receipt of any requests to re-open any investigation, nor is it in receipt of any objections by any interested parties to the recommendations it has made”.

“The members of the MCIB recognise that some investigations arise from very tragic circumstances and that any investigation may cause added distress,” it said.

Read more on the Sunday Independent here

Minister for Transport Eamon Ryan says he plans a review of how marine accidents are investigated which should take “several months”.

Addressing an Oireachtas Transport and Networks Communications committee on Friday (Jan 29), Mr Ryan said that the the “fundamental review” would be conducted by an independent expert.

The review would examine “the structures in place for marine accident investigation”, how it is structured overseas and how “other modes” are treated in Ireland, he said.

“This is by no means a criticism of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) and its members past and present, its secretariat or its investigators and the valuable work they have undertaken,” Mr Ryan said

“However, circumstances have changed since the Policy Review Group’s 1998 report and the enactment of the 2000 Act and in light of the European Court of Justice judgment, I consider it to be an opportune time to have such a review,” he said.

“The review will look at how maritime accident investigation is structured overseas and also how other modes are treated in Ireland,” he said.

Last year, the European Court of Justice found that the MCIB was not independent, as its board included the Department of Transport secretary-general, or his or her deputy, and the Marine Survey Office (MSO) chief surveyor.

These two post holders resigned last year.

However, a report to the Oireachtas committee earlier this month by maritime lawyer Michael Kingston said the MCIB was “not fit for purpose”, stating it was under-resourced and had failed to conduct a number of investigations which it was statutorily obliged to.

At Friday’s committee hearing, Mr Ryan rejected a call by Mr Kingston for the immediate establishment of an independent investigation unit into marine accidents with adequate resources.

Mr Kingston, whose father Tim died in the Whiddy Island Betelgeuse explosion in 1979, pointed out a review had already taken place in 1998 with recommendations, and another review would only delay matters.

Mr Kingston said lessons needed to be learned from marine accidents, and this required a properly resourced investigation unit which might cost €350,000.

He said it would be a fraction of the cost of a €50 million annual search and rescue helicopter contract.

His call was supported by Fine Gael TD for Clare Joe Carey, Fianna Fáil senator Timmy Dooley and Green Party TD Steven Matthews who urged Ryan to take more immediate action than commissioning another review which might be “long-fingered”.

Mr Ryan said that he intended to proceed with amendments to the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) (Amendment) Bill 2020, which would involve reconstituting the MCIB board.

He said that the 1998 review was no longer sufficient, and further legislation could be introduced after a review took place.

Mr Ryan said the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) (Amendment) Bill 2020 should be” viewed as a transitional measure and not a permanent legislative framework for marine accident investigation in the State”.

“Further legislation may be required following completion of the review,” he said.

“Pending the outcome of the Review, it is imperative that the State continues to have a functioning marine investigation body in place,” he said.

A new report submitted to the Oireachtas has slammed the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) as “not fit for purpose”, according to the Irish Examiner.

Capt Neil Forde of maritime consultancy Marine Hazard Ltd claims that the MCIB has not been investigating certain matters for which it had a statutory duty.

These include as serious incidents in which people entered the water while boarding or alighting from vessels moored alongside.

Capt Forde — who last year suggested the appointment of a Secretary of Sate’s Representative to deal with major maritime or shipping incidents — added that the board should also take greater involvement in regulating leisure craft, such as establishing a minimum standard of training for operating such vessels.

Last September two civil servants stepped down from the MCIB following a ruling by the European Court of Justice found that it lacked independence.

The Irish Examiner has more on the story HERE.

A potentially serious incident involving a fishing vessel in Kerry’s Blasket Sound could have been avoided if there were adequate facilities in the wheelhouse to make hot drinks, a report has found. 

Five crew onboard the 23m trawler Dearbhla had a narrow escape, when their vessel struck rocks off the north-west of Inis na Bró in the Blaskets on May 14th last.

The skipper was able to manoeuvre the vessel into deeper water, but it was found to have sustained substantial damage on its stern and under the bow when it was examined later in Bere Island Boatyard, Co Cork.

The Dearbhlá was on its way from Ros-a-Mhil, Co Galway to Howth, Co Dublin via the Kerry coast with a relief skipper when the incident occurred at about 4.10 am on May 14th. 

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) report into the incident records that there was a moderate northerly breeze when the vessel left Ros-a-Mhíl on the evening of May 13th, decreasing to light winds with good visibility and slight sea state.

The vessel was northwest of Sybil Point at 3 am when the skipper called a crewmember, named “A” in the report, to take over the wheelhouse watch and instructed him to proceed through Blasket Sound.

The skipper had gone to his bunk when crew member “A” changed course and then went to the tea station in the crew mess to make a cup of tea 

Before leaving the wheelhouse, he switched off the watchkeeper alarm, which is timed to give an audible sound every ten minutes to ensure the watchkeeper remains alert.

The crewman forgot to turn back on the watch alarm when he returned with his tea, and fell asleep shortly after. There was no one else on the bridge, and the bridge watch alarm was switched off also.

The vessel was on autopilot, and making a speed of 8.7 knots, but a course change was required before it reached the Blasket island of Inis na Bró.

When the fishing grounded on rocks on the northwest peninsula of Inis na Bró, the skipper was called immediately and the crew alerted 

The report says the skipper manoeuvred the fishing vessel away from the rocks, and the crew investigated the damage – establishing that there was no water ingress, and no vibration felt from the propulsion system.

As the skipper didn’t think the vessel was in danger, the emergency services were not alerted, and he continued at reduced speed while a continuous assessment was made 

After the skipper contacted the owner at 8 am, the vessel was re-routed to Berehaven for inspection and damage assessment at Bere Island Boatyard, arriving at 9am. 

On May 15th, the vessel was inspected by a Marine Survey Office (MSO) surveyor, who detained it on the grounds of the damage to the bow and stem and expired certification.

The MCIB report says that “by falling asleep whilst on watch in the wheelhouse, the watchkeeper did not make the necessary course alteration to keep the vessel in safe and navigable waters” 

It says the incident may have been averted if the required course change to navigate Blasket Sound safely was better supervised, and if there were adequate facilities in the wheelhouse to make beverages and allow watchkeepers to take light refreshments 

It also says it may have been averted if the watchkeeper alarm panel keyed switch facility had been used as intended by its designer.

It says that “no evidence was provided demonstrating that the crew had received adequate training to reduce the risks of endangering the health and safety of the crew or preventing accidents”.

It recommends the Minister for Transport should remind owners and operators of fishing vessels of the need for training under the Merchant Shipping (Safety of Fishing Vessels) (15 – 24 metres) Regulations 2007, particularly relating to health and safety and accident prevention.

It also says the minister should remind owners and operators of the obligation to notify the MSO Chief Surveyor when a vessel has been involved in a marine casualty.

 It recommends the minister issue a marine notice to remind vessel owners and operators to ensure “all navigation is planned in adequate detail, and that passage plans, with contingency plans where appropriate, are compiled and made known to the crew”. 

These contingency plans and procedures should include provision for a grounding event or collision incident, it says.

Download the full report here.

The latest Marine Notice from the Department of Transport draws attention to the Code of Practice for the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft, following two recent reports from the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB).

In October, the MCIB’s report into the death of a long West Cork fisherman 12 months previously suggested that he may have fallen overboard from this open-deck vessel.

As previously reported on Afloat.ie, the MCIB determined that 23-year-old Kodie Healy was not wearing a lifejacket or personal flotation device (PFD) prior to the indecent in Dunmanus Bay on 9 October 2019 — and he may not have been aware of a personal locator beacon on his vessel.

September’s report into an incident on Lough Mask in March 2019 also found that the individual involved was not wearing a lifejacket.

The MCIB was unable to establish the cause of the incident on 8 March in which the 78-year-old experienced angler drowned. But the fact his boat was found upright suggests he had fallen overboard and was unable to get back into his boat.

Marine Notice No 58 of 2020 (available to download below) highlights to all operators of recreational craft the important of abiding by legal requirements to wear a PFD while on board an open craft (or on the deck of decked craft) under seven meres in length.

As well as reminding boaters to ensure they check current weather forecasts and sea/lake/river conditions prior to departure, the notice also underscores the increased risks involved in single-handed boating.

Boaters should carry out a risk assessment to minimise the inherent risks involved when setting out single-handed without any colleagues to help or raise the alarm when in difficulty.

The Code of Practice is a free download from the Department of Transport website. Hard copies are also available on request, in both English and Irish, from the Marine Safety Policy Division at [email protected]