The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) says the Royal Cork Yacht Club (RCYC) should take action to ensure skippers and people in charge of its racing yacht fleet review their crew training obligations.
The review should be conducted in the context of Irish Sailing rules, regulations and procedures, the MCIB says.
It is one of four recommendations it has issued to the RCYC in its report on the grounding of the Class 1 racer/cruiser Jelly Baby during the 2021 Autumn league series in Cork harbour.
No one was injured in the incident on October 24th, 2021, when nine crew were competing in the last race of the series.
However, the bowman went overboard, prompting a series of actions which highlighted a lack of man overboard (MOB) procedures being correctly followed, the MCIB says.
The report describes how “on rounding the third mark of the racecourse, W2 buoy, the crew were preparing to change sails when they encountered difficulties rigging a gennaker which is a type of downwind sail”.
“During efforts to overcome these difficulties the gennaker and the bowman went over the side of the yacht. The bowman was pulled back onboard by the crew but the gennaker became entangled around the keel, rudder and propeller and disabled the yacht,”it says.
“ The yacht luffed up to port towards the shore and shortly thereafter went aground on a lee shore (according to the skipper’s report to the MCIB) on Bull Rock at Weavers Point on the west side of the entrance to Cork harbour,”it says.
“ The bowman was successfully recovered and the crew were uninjured, but the yacht remained aground until floated on the following flood tide and was then towed to Crosshaven,”it says.
“The damage to the yacht was such that its insurers declared it to be a constructive loss (i.e. deemed a total loss). The yacht was repaired and the MCIB was advised it sails on Belfast Lough,”it says.
“The crewmember was wearing a personal flotation device ( PFD) but not a tether. As a result, the immediate focus of the skipper was on recovering the bowman. MOB procedures were not activated,”it says.
“ The sails were not released so the yacht kept driving forward. All the crewmembers except one rushed to the starboard to assist the bowman and to try and recover the gennaker. This led to the boat heeling even more to leeward. The effect of heeling the boat to leeward is to make it luff up into the wind,”it says.
“ The greater the angle of heel, the greater is the turning moment towards the wind direction, in this case towards the land. The crew responded to the emergency in a manner that evidenced the lack of a MOB procedure and appropriate training in that procedure,”it says.
Winds in the Roches Point area were fresh to strong Beaufort Force 5 or 6 southwesterly (mean wind speed 18 to 22 knots) with occasional gusts of 31 knots, the report says, and there was a small craft warning.
Visibility was generally good (greater than 5 nautical miles), and was moderate (2 – 5 nautical miles) in showers.
“Neither the weather conditions forecast and estimated by Met Éireann or assessed by the RCYC’s race officers were unusual for weather experienced in Cork Harbour in the Autumn and were not outside the design criteria for a RCD category ‘A’ designed yacht such as yacht Jelly Baby,”it says.
“ However, given the forecast and the Small Craft Warning, the race officer should have mandated the wearing of PFDs, and the skippers should have considered the use of tethers in particular, for bowmen,” it says.
The MCIB investigation examined video footage and outlined a number of measures the skipper could have taken, with events unfolding rapidly.
The report found key causative factors “leading to the putting at risk the bowman and crew and the grounding and loss of yacht Jelly Baby:
a) The crew’s response to sailing mishaps were not consistent with those to be expected from an appropriately trained yacht crew. The disruption initiated by a snagged halyard started the chain of events. This was followed by the bowman going over the side and hanging on while he was trying to retrieve the sail in the water.
b) Irrespective of the policy of Irish Sailing that reflects the issues around whether tethers should be worn or not and in what circumstances, it remain a fact that the bowman was not wearing a tether which led to the risk situation being far greater and contributed to the decisions that were made.
c) The crew were overwhelmed by these events and failed to react correctly in a prompt and efficient manner as was required in the situation. The absence of crew training to keep control of, or stopping, the yacht while appropriately coping with the mishaps as they occurred.
d) While the different interpretation and application of Tethered Man Overboard/MOB urged on the MCIB is noted, the absence of the initiation of a MOB procedure or crisis management outstretched the capability of the crew to effectively manage a succession of escalating mishaps.
e) absence of appropriate actions by the crew and their lack of training for these sort of events
The MCIB says it has been “urged by the RCYC (and by Irish Sailing) to assess the situation that occurred as not amounting to a MOB (or Man Overboard Tethered) as the bowman remained attached to the yacht”.
“No authority or source has been provided to support this interpretation. The MCIB has considered this but does not agree that this is the correct interpretation of the situation as it is clear that there was a MOB,”it says.
“ The absence of a practiced MOB procedure which would define the appropriate actions to be taken by the crew before the yacht struck the ground at Weavers Point, was a causative factor in the loss of yacht Jelly Baby,”it says.
The report notes that the skipper and the RCYC “stated that the crew were highly experienced and trained”.
“However, one mishap rapidly led to another, and these series of minor mishaps together with the lack of procedures to deal with the MOB situation overwhelmed the crew’s capability to cope and effectively control the yacht,”it says.
“The crew’s response to events subsequent to the initial snagged halyard mishap were not consistent with those to be expected from an appropriately trained team as the disruption in the crew’s performance overwhelmed their capability to manage these events,”it says.
It says that an RCYC report “also considers that the RCYC considered the training did not contribute in any way to the incident”.
“No recommendations are made in the RCYC report for any changes of practise. Nor is there any reference to the assessment of the weather, or the decision not to fly the Flag “Y”, or, to skippers giving consideration to the wearing of tethers,”the MCIB says.
The report issues four recommendations to the RCYC, also including facilitating and promoting a programme of crew training to enable crew to cope effectively with onboard crisis events and their management.
It says the RCYC should consider having an audit from time to time to verify that the crew on participating yachts (in particular those who are members of the club itself) have suitable and verifiable training and experience.
It says the RCYC should review the qualification of its panel of race officers in line with Irish Sailing grading, and should review its training of the assessment of, and procedures applicable to, weather conditions.
The MCIB says that Irish Sailing should consider the content of this report and the scope of sailing training in respect of man overboard to extend to general crew.
It says Irish Sailing “should also consider the introduction of refresher course/certification for skippers/yacht masters”, and “should continue to facilitate and promote a programme of crew training to enable crew to cope effectively with onboard crisis events and their management”.
It says the Minister for Transport should consider revision of the man overboard section in the Code of Practice: The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft, ensuring that it includes “tethered man overboard” guidance.
“It should be noted that Irish Sailing assisted the MCIB in the preparation of aspects of this report for which we are grateful,”it says.
Irish Sailing has advised the MCIB that it intends to “use this report as a learning opportunity, by establishing a cross functional team, across their relevant policy groups”.
This would facilitate consideration of “learning opportunities across the full range of sailing activities, the national implications and the practical implementations which may arise, taking into account international standards in safety, rules and training structures”, it says.
The full MCIB report is here
